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Application of multisource feedback (MSF) increased dramatically and became 
widespread globally in the past two decades, but there was little conceptual work 
regarding self-other agreement and few empirical studies investigated self-other 
agreement in other cultural settings. This study developed a new conceptual framework 
of self-other agreement and used three samples to illustrate how national culture 
affected self-other agreement. These three samples included 428 participants from 
China, 818 participants from the US, and 871 participants from globally dispersed teams 
(GDTs). An EQS procedure and a polynomial regression procedure were used to 
examine whether the covariance matrices were equal across samples and whether the 
relationships between self-other agreement and performance would be different across 
cultures, respectively. The results indicated MSF could be applied to China and GDTs, 
but the pattern of relationships between self-other agreement and performance was 
different across samples, suggesting that the results found in the U.S. sample were the 
exception rather than rule. Demographics also affected self-other agreement disparately 
across perspectives and cultures, indicating self-concept was susceptible to cultural 
influences. The proposed framework only received partial support but showed great 
promise to guide future studies. This study contributed to the literature by: (a) 
developing a new framework of self-other agreement that could be used to study 
various contextual factors; (b) examining the relationship between self-other agreement 
and performance in three vastly different samples; (c) providing some important insights 
about consensus between raters and self-other agreement; (d) offering some practical 
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Feedback is critical to the survival of all systems, regardless of whether 
they are individuals or institutions. A system is composed of four basic 
components: input, throughput, output, and feedback loop (Katz & Kahn, 1978). 
The feedback loop runs from output to input to control variations and keep the 
system in equilibrium. The breakdown of the feedback loop would cause the 
system’s dissipation. For individuals, the feedback loop is innately built in and 
can operate automatically. For institutions, however, the feedback loop has to be 
designed and built in with intention. Performance appraisal is intended to serve 
such a feedback function. 
As success of an organization depends on efforts from each individual that 
is composed of the organization, the organization needs to make sure everyone 
performs to the expectation. An intuitive approach is to measure the employee’s 
output quality and quantity, a method can be traced back to time study (Taylor, 
1911/1947) and motion study (Gilbreth, 1909, 1911). However, objective 
evidence does not always exist (Festinger, 1954). Objective outcome measures 
for individuals become even harder to define when interdependency among 
employees increases as tasks become more complex. As a result, indirect, or 
more subjective measures, become surrogates for objective outcome measures. 
To ensure the accuracy of subjective measures, a standardized procedure, 
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named performance appraisal, is adopted by the organization to evaluate, judge, 
or estimate each employee’s degree of meeting expectations and goals. 
Performance appraisal has been adopted widely by organizations (Teel, 1980). 
However, dissatisfaction with traditional performance appraisal increased 
in recent years (Coens & Jenkins, 2000). Some researchers (e.g., Deming, 1986) 
insist that the use of performance appraisal should discontinue. There are 
several major concerns. The first one is about the accuracy of performance 
appraisal. Managers tend to assign uniform ratings to employees regardless of 
performance (Murphy, 1992). The second concern is related to the changing 
nature of the job. As tasks become more complex and interdependency among 
employees gets higher, considering only the manager’s perspective appears 
quite narrow. As the scope of performance expands (Borman & Motowidlo, 1993), 
managers face more challenges to evaluate their subordinates’ performance. 
Third, performance appraisal is a top-down process that served solely 
organizational purposes (Hedge, Borman & Birkeland, 2001). The results of 
appraisal are tied to compensation, promotion, or even negative employment 
decisions. Employees feel threatened and stigmatized when they have to sit with 
supervisors to discuss their performance (Meyer, 1991). Antonioni (1994) pointed 
out that almost one third of managers believed their performance appraisals were 
very ineffective and more than one third of companies had stopped using or are 
considering abolishing performance appraisal.  
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Various approaches have been adopted to mitigate the aforementioned 
problems. First, more format forms are created to reduce rating errors (Austin & 
Villanova, 1992). Although formats are helpful in controlling bias, this approach is 
too narrowly focused (Feldman, 1981; Landy & Farr, 1980). Second, different 
perspectives of performance are incorporated in performance ratings (Landy & 
Farr, 1980). Bernardin, Dahmus, and Redmon (1993) observed that managers 
react more favorably to ratings from multiple sources than from only one source. 
Third, performance appraisal is designed to serve different purposes, which 
generally can be categorized into developmental and administrative (Campbell, 
2001). Giving development-oriented feedback based on the performance 
appraisal data can make performance appraisal meaningful to both the 
organization and the employee. Multisource Feedback (MSF), which incorporates 
multiple perspectives and serves mainly developmental purposes, shows a great 
promise in overcoming the weaknesses of traditional performance appraisal. 
MSF is also called 360 degree feedback, multirater assessment, multirater 
feedback, multisource assessment, full-circle feedback, upward feedback, etc. 
(Bracken, Timmreck & Church, 2001a). MSF refers to “the practice of involving 
multiple raters, often including self rating, in the assessment of individuals” 
(Tornow, 1993a, p. 211). Rater could include supervisors, peers, subordinates, 
customers, and others who are familiar with the ratee’s performance and whose 
perspectives are valuable to the organization and the individual, because validity 
of ratings depends on the opportunity to observe the individual’s work through 
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interaction on the job. All raters should use a standardized assessment 
instrument to rate the performance of the ratee. MSF has received more 
acceptance from users (Maurer & Tarulli, 1996), and seems more legally 
defensible than traditional performance appraisal (Brown, n.d.).  
Antonioni (1996) reported that an estimated 25% of companies were using 
some type of upward or 360-degree-feedback process. According to Yammarino 
and Atwater (1997), a majority of Fortune 500 companies employed 360-degree 
feedback. They listed more than 50 of the world’s most prestigious companies 
who had adopted MSF, such as, IBM, 3M, Johnson & Johnson, and Motorola. 
The best companies choose to develop their own executive talent inside and 
MSF is seen as one of the most effective development tools along with mentoring 
and coaching (Handfield-Jones, 2000). A recent estimation shows that over one 
third of U.S. companies are using some type of MSF process for managers 
(Bracken, Timmreck & Church, 2001a). Application of MSF has also escalated as 
multinational companies (MNCs) take the practice to the globe (Gillespie, 2005).  
With increased application in the field, research on MSF has grown 
dramatically. The research momentum is evident in special issues of journals and 
edited books, such as Human Resource Management around 360 degree 
feedback (Tornow 1993b), Group and Organizational Management (Church & 
Bracken, 1997), and The Handbook of Multisource Feedback: The 
Comprehensive Resource for Designing and Implementing MSF Processes 
(Bracken, Timmreck, & Church, 2001b). Articles in the special issues and the 
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handbook represent the scope and depth of current research on MSF. Topics go 
beyond rating accuracy to include those that concern practitioners the most in the 
field, such as self-other agreement, measurement equivalence, improvements 
after feedback, MSF application in organizational change. Studies based on field 
data have increased dramatically since 1990s, with more cooperative efforts 
between researchers and practitioners. 
Introducing multiple perspectives to performance appraisal clearly is an 
advantage of MSF, but it has some liabilities as well. The most prominent one is 
how to interpret rating differences between sources, particularly, self-other 
agreement or disagreement. A natural tendency is to see lack of agreement as 
errors. This view can be traced back to Cronbach’s criticisms of accuracy 
research in person perception (Kenny & Albright, 1987). MSF researchers (e.g., 
Yammarino & Atwater, 1993; Church, 1994; Church, 1997; Fletcher, 1997; 
Fletcher & Baldry, 2000; Wohlers & London, 1989) argue that lack of agreement 
or discrepancy between ratings is not error but something meaningful. For 
example, self-other agreement could be an index of self-awareness (Wohlers 
&London, 1989), where self-awareness is defined as the extent of individual’s 
understanding of his/her own strengths and weaknesses. Seeing self-other 
agreement as something meaningful instead of error has provoked strong 
research interest in the MSF field, but little work exists regarding the self-other 
agreement process. Several models have been proposed to clarify these 
ambiguities (e.g., Atwater & Yammarino, 1997; Campbell, 1985, cited in 
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Campbell, 1988; Yammarino & Atwater, 1993), but they generally fail to paint a 
clear picture how self-other agreement is achieved and what may affect the 
process. More theory development and empirical research are expected. 
 The issue of self-other agreement gets even more complicated when MSF 
reaches to a global scale. Applying MSF to other cultures may face many 
challenges. For example, is measurement equivalent across cultures? Are 
leadership styles generalizable in different cultures? Do globally dispersed teams 
have the same understanding of MSF? What are the cultural implications for self-
other agreement? These questions are meaningful to explore. Fletcher (1997) 
summarized some cultural studies in the area of performance appraisal. He 
lamented that very little empirical work regarding cultural effects on performance 
appraisal existed. While there were some studies being conducted between 
western countries, few were done in non-western countries. Cross-cultural 
research on self-other agreement was even more rare. Levy and Williams (2004) 
identified numerous contextual variables that could affect performance appraisal 
but located few cross-cultural studies. A more recent example is a study 
conducted by Atwater et al. (2005), who explored the relationship between self-
other agreement and performance in the U.S. and European nations. Atwater et 
al. (2005) also noted that very little research on self-other agreement has been 
conducted outside the U.S. 
 This study developed a conceptual framework that took culture’s impact 
on self-other agreement into consideration and applied empirical data to validate 
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the framework. This effort is aligned with Landy and Farr’s (1980) and Feldman’s 
(1981) suggestion that more process and context research are needed in 
performance appraisal. This study can not only deepen our understanding of self-
other agreement but also provide some practical guidance to applications of MSF 
in other cultures. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
Historical Roots and Current Forces 
Performance appraisal in the modern sense doesn’t have a long history 
but its antecedents have existed for a long time. To have a clear understanding 
of MSF, it’s important to know the pieces that compose MSF. The first segment 
will introduce the historical roots of MSF and then describe some current forces 
that shape MSF to date. A phrase of evaluation system is used to refer to a more 
ancient form of performance appraisal, in order to distinguish it from the more 
modern one, which is the focus of this study.    
Historical Roots of MSF 
The earliest evaluation system could date back to thousands of years ago 
in China. Various criteria and institutions were established to evaluate 
bureaucrats’ performance in different historic periods. The evaluation system 
provided means and standards to identify high and poor performers, who would 
then be rewarded or punished based on the evaluation results. Such a practice 
lasted thousands of years and is still in use in modern Chinese government. This 
method was introduced to civil service in Europe and U.S. in late 1800s. Around 
1900, the Federal Civil Service of the United States began giving merit ratings to 
its employees and set up special institutions to manage it (Wiese & Buckley, 
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1998). Meanwhile, psychologists started playing role in this fledging field through 
assisting the military to assess officer performance in early 1900s. The practice 
was then translated to the industry world when employers realized its potential to 
improve organizational effectiveness. A modern evaluation process, performance 
appraisal, found its way to the modern management system.  
The psychologist’s role is to help organizations to improve the 
effectiveness of performance appraisal. They assisted employers to develop a 
variety of appraising procedures and tools, such as global ratings and global 
essays, judgmental rank order, graphic- and trait ratings, forced-choice, and 
critical incidence (see Landy & Farr, 1980; Wiese & Buckley, 1998). More rating 
formats, such as behaviorally anchored scales, behavioral expectation scales 
and behavioral observation scales, were developed during 1960s and 1970s, and 
“this period saw rating format research reach its zenith in popularity along with 
research on rater training and rater individual differences” (Austin & Villanova, 
1992, p. 853). Meanwhile, the content of appraisal evolved from one global 
measure to several broad traits, from several broad traits to a number of specific 
traits, from traits to behaviors and short-term goals (see McGregor, 1957). Many 
studies were conducted to understand the relative strengths and weaknesses of 
these formats. Drawing on research on psychological ratings (e.g., Thorndike, 
1920; Bingman, 1939; Knight, 1923; Moore, 1937), performance appraisal 
research during this period focused on rating bias due to raters and rating 
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formats. The latter has remained as one of the main topics of interest among 
researchers until today.  
As more and more organizations accepted performance appraisal 
practices, some pioneers, either practitioners or researchers, began 
experimenting with using raters other than supervisors (e.g., Hollander, 1954, 
1956, 1957; Maloney & Hinrichs, 1959; Rupe, 1951; Wherry & Fryer, 1949; 
Williams & Leavitt, 1947). Researchers in 1950s and 1960s were intrigued by 
these new forms of rating. For example, after peer-rating was introduced 
(Hollander, 1954), research was conducted to understand its psychometric 
qualities (e.g., Gordon & Medland, 1965; Fiske & Cox, 1960) and applications 
(Weitz, 1958). Later on, more and more studies focused on contrasting between 
ratings from different sources. For example, Lawler (1967) examined self-, 
supervisor-, and peer-ratings of performance with convergent and discriminant 
analyses and found that supervisor- and peer-ratings had greater validity than 
self-ratings. Thornton (1968) compared self-ratings with supervisor-ratings in 
predicting promotability, and identified some meaningful discrepancies between 
two perspectives. Landy and Farr (1980) described additional studies.  
While research on different rating sources were receiving more and more 
attention in the industry world in late 1970s and 1980s, research took on a 
different direction and focused more on understanding the cognitive aspects of 
performance appraisal. Landy and Farr (1980) updated the process model of 
performance rating and included cognitive processes as a key component that 
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deserved more research. Feldman (1981) proposed a framework of cognitive 
processes, which was later refined by Ilgen and Feldman (1983). The framework 
includes attention, categorization, recall and information integration processes. 
Feldman’s social cognitive approach suggested a research shift from rater and 
rating format to rating process. Many similar models were proposed (e.g., DeNisi, 
1996; DeNisi, Cafferty & Meglino, 1984; Ilgen & Feldman, 1983; Spool, 1978). 
From a different field, Lord and his associates also proposed their leadership 
perception models (Hanges, Lord & Dickson, 2000; Lord, 1985; Lord, Foti & 
DeVader, 1984).  
Cognitive approaches to performance appraisal, however, have some 
major problems. First, it is usually conducted in the laboratory and uses students 
as samples, thus its implications for industry are vague (Banks & Murphy, 1985; 
Bretz, Milkovich & Read, 1992; Napier & Latham, 1986). Second, while it focuses 
mainly on processes, social contexts are not adequately considered (Bernardin & 
Villanova, 1986). Feldman (1981) suggested that research first be conducted in 
the laboratory and then in the field, but research in the field often lagged behind. 
Banks and Murphy (1985) cautioned that the research-practice gap was widening 
and the cognitive processing approach failed to address the willingness 
component of rating, which clearly ties to rating contexts. In contrast, MSF 
incrementally gained popularity in the business world. Based on the research on 
multiple rating sources and the ideas of assessment for development, Robert 
Bailey from the Center for Creative Leadership developed the first MSF survey in 
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mid-1970s (see Campbell, 2001). Since then, MSF offerings grew steadily. Van 
Velsor and Leslie (1991) listed 16 MSF instruments and the number grew to 24 
seven years later (Leslie & Fleenor, 1998). There are even more instruments 
owned by companies who have developed them privately. At the beginning of 
1990s, MSF became a popular management practice in the business world and 
research using MSF data also increased dramatically afterwards.  
 There are two other issues in the field of performance appraisal and MSF 
that are worth mentioning; one is practice-related and the other is research-
related. The first issue is about which purpose (administration or development) 
performance appraisal or MSF should serve. Performance appraisal or MSF was 
initially designed for administrative purposes, such as compensation, promotion, 
and so on. As an example, Weitz (1958) published an article labeled “Selecting 
supervisors with peer-ratings.” Performance appraisal for individual development 
started gaining attention in 1960s (read the Perce Corp story, Campbell, 2001). 
The 1970s and 1980s saw an intense debate over which purpose should take the 
priority or whether they could coexist. For instance, Reinhardt (1985) noted that 
performance appraisal used for administrative purposes still dominated in mid-
1980s, while Campbell and Lee (1988) suggested using self-ratings for 
developmental rather than evaluative purposes. This debate ended up separating 
MSF from performance appraisal. The title now becomes “Don’t tie 360 feedback 
to pay” (Coates, 1998). 
 
                                                                                                  
 13 
The other issue is about the relationship between different fields of 
research. From 1950s to 1970s, Mainstream researchers moved away from 
studying accuracy and focused more on rating bias, after Cronbach published his 
critique of accuracy research in person perception (Kenny & Albright, 1987). A 
small pocket of researchers, mainly I/O psychologists, continued to pursue 
accuracy, while others moved away from accuracy research and focused on a 
new arena—cognitive processes (Funder, 1995). Being away from the 
mainstream makes performance appraisal research a relatively closed field. 
Performance appraisal researchers seldom look to other literatures, such as 
selection and personality. Particularly, few MSF researchers notice person 
perception and interpersonal perception research (e.g., Funder, 1995; Kenny, 
1991; Kenny, 1994; Kenny & Albright, 1987), although the relevance is high.   
MSF in a Flat World 
Pioneer users of performance appraisal, either ancient Chinese 
governments or modern American Army, are characterized by strict hierarchies. 
Before 1950s, bureaucratic structure and belief in rationality were also 
characteristics of business organizations (Ouchi & Wilkins, 1985). A top-down 
approach of performance appraisal is a natural extension of a paradigm that 
emphasizes objectivity, structure, and control. However, informal aspects of 
organizational life have received more and more attention since1950s, with 
different management paradigms being proposed (e.g., human relations, socio-
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technical systems). Work groups and participation have become routine practices 
of more and more organizations since 1970s.  
The organization is getting flatter as traditional hierarchical structure goes 
out of fashion and the team structure gains currency (Lawler, Mohrman & 
Ledford, 1995). Performance appraisal becomes a challenging task for 
supervisors in the new organizational reality. First, supervisors now have less 
opportunity to observe each person’s performance due to increased span of 
control. Second, roles and responsibilities have been broadened with increasing 
interdependency among team members. Measures of performance have gone 
beyond pure job-related performance to include contextual performance (Borman 
& Motowidlo, 1993). Third, jobs have become more complex as they are more 
knowledge-based (Drucker, 1993) and supervisors may not know exactly what 
each employee is doing. Finally, a team-based structure and a participation-
oriented culture acknowledge a need to balance company and individual 
interests. The development of MSF is contingent on these changes taking place 
in the organization. For instance, McGregor (1957) and Thornton (1980) noted 
that increased use of self-ratings can be attributed to the general trend toward 
participative management. Lawler (1994) also ascribed the use of different rating 
sources to the movement towards employee empowerment and team-based 
organization.  
Globalization and the technology revolution also are making the world 
flatter (Friedman, 2005). Improved communication technologies and globalized 
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business practices make international virtual teams a way of living. People who 
are stationed in different parts of the world can now work closely as a team, even 
though they may never meet each other face-to-face. Collecting subordinates’ 
performance information becomes particularly difficult for supervisors, as they 
may not have enough opportunity to observe those subordinates working in 
different locations or nations. Relying solely on the supervisor to conduct 
performance appraisal is virtually impossible. Moreover, subordinates may come 
from different cultures and have different ways of doing things, and supervisors 
who are not familiar with those cultures will have difficulty in rating their 
performance. As the world is getting flatter, performance appraisal needs to 
address these unprecedented challenges from geography and culture. 
Summary for This Section 
 MSF originates from the traditional performance appraisal but is different 
from it. MSF is built on decades of performance appraisal research, with 
generations of psychologists’ relentless efforts. Performance appraisal made its 
way to the business world after its initial success in the military. Many years’ 
research on rating formats, rater characteristics, and rating processes has built 
up a strong scientific foundation for performance appraisal. However, research 
on alternative rating resources (self, peers, and subordinates) took a critical leap 
in mid-1970s and gave birth to MSF, which finally gained its independence from 
the traditional performance appraisal as performance appraisal research shied 
away from business needs.  Social and technical forces also play an important 
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role in shaping MSF. Working for a flatter organization in a flatter world poses 
many unprecedented challenges to traditional performance appraisal. MSF has 
several advantages over traditional one-way performance appraisal. First, it 
helps to gather as much as information possible, despite geographical barriers. 
Second, it makes the workplace more participative. Third, it fosters a learning 
culture in the team and promotes employee development. Fourth, it increases the 
alignment among team members and with the organization. These strengths 
make MSF a powerful management tool in the new era.  
States and Issues of MSF 
 The previous segment introduced some historical roots and current forces 
that contributed to MSF’s development. MSF features multiple perspectives. As a 
result, its accuracy depends on respective reliabilities and validities of ratings 
provided by different sources. Among different rating sources, peer-ratings and 
supervisor-ratings are the most reliable, with the mean single rater reliability for 
supervisors being .52 and that for peers being .42 (Viswesvaran, Ones & 
Schmidt, 1996). Another meta-analysis done by Conway and Huffcutt (1997) 
reported slightly lower interrater reliability coefficients for supervisor and peer-
ratings (.50 for supervisors and .37 for peers). The mean reliability to 
subordinate-ratings is lower. According to Conway and Huffcutt, the mean 
reliability for subordinates is .30. Although reliabilities for peer and subordinates 
appear quite low, increasing the number of raters can substantially improve the 
reliabilities. Conway and Huffcutt inferred that two supervisors or three peers 
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could boost the reliabilities to .70. For subordinates, as many as six would be 
enough to ensure a reliability of the same magnitude. These reliability 
coefficients are generally satisfactory. However, self-rating has been shown 
susceptible to self-inflation and have lower reliability and lower validity (e.g., 
Campbell & Lee, 1988; Dunning, Heath & Suls, 2004; Fox & Dinur, 1988; 
Thornton, 1980), possibly due to egocentric bias, which may result from ratee’s 
defensiveness, self-esteem, and attribution propensity (Harris & Schaubroeck, 
1988). Despite its lower reliability, self-rating offers a unique perspective to 
performance appraisal (Bassett & Meyer, 1968; Thornton, 1968). Moreover, self-
rating plays a critical role in understanding self-other agreement. 
While the reliability of MSF is generally adequate, the evidence for its 
validity is more controversial. The fundamental underlying assumption of MSF 
states that ratings from different sources (e.g., superiors, peers, subordinates) 
provide unique and meaningful information about a target manager’s 
performance (Murphy & Cleveland, 1995), and thus a source effect will present 
and MSF will demonstrate higher validity than traditional one-way performance 
appraisal. There is some support for this notion. Barrett (1966) argued that 
organizational position of the rater has significant impact on the rating as people 
in different positions tend to have different opportunity to observe the ratee. 
Subordinates may be the best source of information on delegation, motivating 
and developing others while peers may be in the better position to rate 
competencies like decision making and collaboration (Pollack & Pollack, 1996). 
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Salam, Cox, and Sims (1997) also found that superiors and subordinates tended 
to perceive the performance of target managers differently, depending on their 
positions and organizational contexts. Pulakos, Schmitt and Chan (1996) 
observed discrepancies between supervisor-ratings and peer-ratings, and they 
also speculated that supervisors and peers might consider different performance 
factors when they provided ratings to the ratee.  
However, Borman (1997) indicated that such differences are generally 
weak. Yammarino (2003) identified three key themes that contradict the 
assumption. First, rating source effects are no stronger than individual rater 
effects. Second, ratings between sources show about as much convergence as 
do ratings within sources, and their relationships to the latent construct are very 
similar. Third, multisource ratings may inform us more about the rater providing 
the data and his or her views rather than about the focal manager who is being 
rated and his or her actual performance. Greguras, Robie, and Born (2001), 
based on the social relations model, also demonstrated that how individuals see 
themselves is congruent with how they see others. Hogan and Shelton (1998) 
pointed out that we tend to think about people from our own perspective and 
rarely do so from their perspective, thus ignoring their goals, aspirations, and 
fears. If Yammarino, Greguras et al., and Hogan and Shelton are right, MSF 
should be repositioned as a tool that doesn’t necessarily reflect the target 
manager’s actual performance.  
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 From the psychometric perspective, which presumes existence of a true 
performance, ratings from different sources are expected to have moderate 
correlations, based on the assumption that raters from different sources should 
contribute additional unique perspectives to the ratee’s performance. However, 
most correlations are below .30s, except that the correlation between supervisor 
and peer reaches .34 (Conway & Huffcutt, 1997). Results from an earlier meta-
analysis (Harris & Schaubroeck, 1988) seem more optimistic. The correlation 
between supervisor and peer is as large as .60, while the correlations between 
self and supervisor, self and peer are in mid .30s. The discrepancies, however, 
could result from the way Harris and Schaubroeck computed the correlations. 
James (1982) has shown that using composite scores could inflate correlation 
between two variables. The results of these two studies should come closer if the 
latter used single rater scores. Some moderators, such as job type, play a part in 
the cross-sources relationships. Conway and Huffcutt (1997) found that the 
supervisor-self and peer-self correlations in managerial jobs are substantially 
lower than those in non-managerial jobs, but the supervisor-peer correlations are 
not affected by job type. Similar patterns were found in the Harris and 
Schaubroeck (1988) study. Lower cross-source correlations in managerial jobs 
could result from lower reliabilities of ratings in these jobs, which in turn could be 
caused by job complexity.  
 Another psychometric approach is to break down the variance of ratings 
into components (usually, ratee, rater, ratee X rater, and measurement error) and 
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see whether the true performance, or the ratee effect, accounts for a large 
proportion of the variance. The theory of measurement (Wherry & Bartlett, 1982) 
provides a useful framework to conduct construct validity studies in MSF 
research as it specifies more subtle effects. The ratee effects are further 
separated into sub-components that correspond to the ratee’s general 
performance and area/dimension specific performance. The rater effects are also 
broken down into sub-components that are source-specific and idiosyncratic to 
the rater. MSF assumes that using raters from different sources can maximize 
the ratee effects and minimize measurement errors. Lance (1994) found support 
for both true performance and idiosyncratic rater effects, with the latter 
accounting for the majority of the variance. Recently, Scullen, Mount and Goff 
(2000) used a two-step structural modeling process, Correlated Uniqueness-
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CU-CFA), to investigate the proportions of 
variance of various components. Results based on two large data sets (n = 2,350 
and n = 2,142) and two forms of questionnaires showed that idiosyncratic rater 
effects accounted for over half of the rating variance (62% and 53% for two data 
sets, respectively), while random measurement error effects were 11% for the 
first data set and 18% for the second data. The source effects accounted for 9% 
of the variance in the first data set and 7% in the second. The results of this 
study are consistent with some researchers’ (e.g., Greguras & Robie, 1998; 
Greguras, Robie & Born, 2001; Lance, 1994; Yammarino, 2003) speculations 
that raters see others as they see themselves. It is also consistent with findings 
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from the Mount et al. (1998) study, which demonstrated that the 10-factor model, 
representing 7 rater factors and 3 trait factors, had the best fit. The good news is, 
though, the measurement error is fairly small, while other effects account for a 
moderate amount of the variance. Scullen et al.’s study also lends some support 
to several assertions in the MSF field: (a) Multisource ratings reflect the ratee’s 
performance; and (b) raters from different sources provide unique perspectives. 
However, multisource ratings don’t seem to account for more performance-
related variance than supervisor-ratings only.  
 Therefore, evidence of validity for MSF is quite mixed. While ratings by 
supervisors, peers, and subordinates are reliable, correlations among them are 
generally low. The fundamental assumption of MSF which states that each rating 
source will provide a unique perspective doesn’t completely hold based on 
available research results (Greguras & Robie, 1998; Greguras, Robie & Born, 
2001; Lance, 1994; Mount et al, 1998; Yammarino, 2003). Idiosyncratic rater 
effects are predominant while true performance accounts for only a small 
proportion of the variance. Scullen et al. (2000) did observe some source effects, 
but they also account for only a small proportion of the variance. Bearing all 
these negative messages in mind, should we continue using MSF? Three 
different discussions may help to answer this question. First, epistemologically, it 
can be argued that MSF is intended to measure different realities, so it is 
valuable if multiple realities can be accurately reflected. A description of two 
epistemological arguments will be offered. Second, a comparison between MSF 
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and assessment centers is conducted to identify improvement opportunities for 
MSF. Third, person perception research is briefly reviewed and its implications to 
MSF are discussed.  
Epistemology of MSF 
After reviewing performance appraisal literature on accuracy, Heneman, 
Wexley and Moore (1987) concluded that most research was constrained by 
theoretical and methodological limitations and laboratory settings, and thus 
offered few useful suggestions to the field. They went on saying, “Instead, 
accuracy may be the amount of interrater agreement between parties in the 
performance appraisal process as to the dimensions and level of performance. If 
this alternative conceptualization were adopted, this will open up a number of 
new avenues for future research” (p. 443). Heneman et al. posed an important 
question about whether a true performance score exists and what standards we 
should choose for accuracy study. The distinction between the realistic paradigm 
and the phenomenal paradigm (Kruglanski, 1989) is relevant here. The former 
term presumes a truth beyond perception while the latter term believes the truth 
is co-created by people in interaction, thus representing a constructivist 
perspective.  
Such a distinction has important implications for MSF research. The 
psychometric approach represents the realistic paradigm. It assumes there is a 
true performance score and deviations from it are errors. In Wherry and Bartlett’s 
(1982) language, the ideal situation is that idiosyncratic rater effects and random 
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measurement errors are at a minimum. As shown in precedent research based 
on the theory of measurement (Wherry & Bartlett, 1982), while random 
measurement errors are low, idiosyncratic rater effects are prominently high. 
Nevertheless, the psychometric perspective dominates the field of performance 
appraisal (Ilgen & Feldman, 1983). Consistent with the phenomenal paradigm, 
Tornow (1993a) speculated that different sources could perceive different 
realities and thus have differential perceptions. Moses, Hollenbeck and Sorcher 
(1993) also suggested a need to differentiate between other people’s 
observations and other people’s expectations. The former is aligned with the 
psychometric perspective, while the latter puts more emphasis on social 
judgments, inferences, or expectations of how a person will behave in a given 
situation. Ashford (1989) also considered the organizational reality as socially 
constructed and thus claimed that both objective and subjective criteria are 
warranted in MSF research.  
 A similar debate takes place in the field of organizational climate research 
in the form of unit of theory. Organizational climate is a higher-level construct that 
reflects organizational attributes. However, organizational climate often bases its 
measurement on individual perceptions of organizational attributes. Individual 
perceptions are aggregated to represent organizational climate. From a realistic 
point of view, aggregation makes no sense as individual perceptions may depart 
from each other. To resolve this unit-of-analysis problem, James and Jones 
(1974) made a distinction between psychological climate and organizational 
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climate, treating the former as an individual-level construct and the latter as an 
organization-level construct. Scores from different individuals can either be 
aggregated into composites to represent organizational climate or remain as 
indicators of psychological climate (Jones and James, 1979). James (1982) 
emphasized the importance to make sure interrater agreement is high enough for 
aggregation. James used two climate variables: fairness and support to illustrate 
that to aggregate adequate interrater agreement must be present as there is no a 
priori assumption of a true score for fairness and support at the organizational 
level. When the item “treat others fairly” is rated by different individuals, the 
ratings could be very different and no true score can be determined. In this case, 
there is no support for the existence of a true reality.  
As an example, Shamir, Zakay, Breinin and Popper (1998) demonstrated 
that supervisors and subordinates did have different expectations of a target 
leader’s charismatic behaviors. In their study, supervisors in the military were 
rated higher in the leader’s effectiveness when he/she displayed exemplary 
behaviors or emphasized ideology, while subordinates demonstrated stronger 
positive culture and discipline when the leader displayed behaviors that 
emphasized collective identity. Supervisors tended to pay more attention to the 
leader’s alignment behaviors while subordinates seemed to enjoy unique unit 
identity more. In addition, Shamir et al. (1998) found that unit culture and 
discipline accounted for additional variance in supervisor-ratings beyond the 
leader’s individual behaviors. Supervisor-ratings thus are based on both 
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leadership behaviors and unit-level products resulted from those behaviors. 
Shamir et al.’s study clearly demonstrates the multiple realities exist and 
aggregation provides additional information about leader perception. This 
example also shows MSF can not only be a tool for measuring, it can also be a 
tool for managing (Wiese & Buckley, 1998). 
Heneman et al.’s (1987) sentiment that accuracy might not be the only 
criterion for performance appraisal research is worth noting. Instead of treating 
discrepancies in ratings as errors, other researchers (e.g., Heneman et al, 1987; 
Moses et al., 1993; Tornow, 1993a) suspect that multiple realities may exist. 
Performance appraisal and MSF should go beyond a narrow psychometric view 
(Ilgen & Feldman, 1983). A broader view of performance appraisal and MSF is 
warranted. In the practice side, MSF has already been used for organizational 
diagnosis (e.g., Church, Waclawski & Burke, 2001). A broader view also means 
to look beyond the MSF field and incorporate best practices and research 
conclusions from other research areas. 
Comparing MSF with Assessment Centers 
Assigning meaning to other’s or one’s own behavior is part of human 
nature, but it is psychologists who structure the process by designing scales and 
assigning numbers to psychological characteristics. The act of making judgments 
and assigning numbers according to a structured scale is called rating. There are 
two basic forms of rating: self-rating and other-rating. Traditional performance 
appraisal uses other rating predominantly but self-rating was introduced due to 
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its unique perspective (Bassett & Meyer, 1968; Thornton, 1968). In contrast, self-
rating dominates personality testing but Epstein (1979, 1980) has proposed using 
other-rating to measure personality. 
This section will focus on other-rating and make a comparison between 
MSF (also performance appraisal) and the assessment center. An assessment 
center features multiple assessors observing behaviors of a participant in 
multiple exercises on multiple dimensions (Thornton, 1992). There are various 
types of other rating (e.g., the structured interview, the assessment center, and 
the survey), among which the assessment center is the most structured and 
sophisticated. The assessment center is also a valid assessment tool (Hunter, 
Schmidt, & Jackson, 1982), especially when it is used for identifying potential and 
when the assessors are psychologists (Gaugler, Rosenthal, Thornton, Bentson, 
1987). A comparison can help us to understand what the assessment center has 
done to improve accuracy and what MSF can learn from it (see Table 1).  
Specifically, an assessment center uses multiple well-trained assessors to 
observe a participant. These assessors can be industrial psychologists or 
managers in the organization. To be qualified, managers are usually two levels 
above the participants, and they must receive training and be certified before 
conducting the center (Thornton, 1992). Such practices can not only make sure 
managers meet the requirements of assessors but also minimize possible role 
conflicts between assessors and participants. As a highly complicated 
assessment tool, extensive training is a prerequisite for assessors. Rater training 
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has been found to be effective in reducing rating errors in performance appraisal, 
especially when the training is extensive (Landy & Farr, 1980; Spool, 1978). 
Woehr and Huffcutt (1994) reviewed 29 studies in the area of rater training and 
found rater training improves rating accuracy. Particularly, Frame of Reference 
training produces an effect size of .83. MSF usually doesn’t have a large rater 
pool from which most competent raters can be chosen, but rater training should 
be conducted consistently (Feldman, 1981).  
 Assessment centers measure complex behaviors that take place in a well-
structured but highly complicated situation. To make observation and rating 
possible, assessors are instructed to focus on behaviors. Each exercise covers a 
certain amount of competencies, with detailed descriptions of behavioral 
standards. These standards represent different levels of behavioral effectiveness, 
with some typical behavioral examples. The assessor’s job is to match behaviors 
they observed during a simulation with pre-established standards. With extensive 
training and experience, assessors will develop a well-structured cognitive map 
of behaviors and competencies. According to Ostroff and Ilgen (1985) and Ilgen, 
Barnes-Farrell, and McKellin (1993), consistent cognitive categories in the rater’s 
mind, which are formed through training and experience, can help to improve 
rating accuracy. When the rater’s schemas are consistent with the dimensions of 
performance, accuracy increases (DeNisi & Summers, 1986; Lauterbach & 
Barnes-Farrell, 1989). Mount and Thompson (1987) also found that subordinates’ 
preconception of ideal supervisor behaviors influences their perceptions of real 
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Table 1  
A Comparison between Assessment Centers and PA/MSF 
Factor Assessment Center PA/MSF 
_______________________________________________________________ 
Assessor/Rater Multiple well trained and 
experienced assessors 
(psychologists, HR personnel, 
or managers two levels up) 
Untrained or partially trained 
managers; for MSF, multiple 
raters are available 
Content Behaviors are grouped into 
competencies, with clear 
behavioral descriptions  
Behaviors are less well 
organized, usually without 
clear behavioral descriptions  
Process Structured materials, 
processes, note-taking, 
behavior classification and 
integration 
Give ratings based on 
recalled behaviors or general 
impressions; no classification 
or integration 
Timeframe 1-3 days; rely on short-term 
memory 
Usually one year; rely on 
long-term memory 
Context Context-free, non-workplace, 
for managers two levels 
higher, for psychologist 
usually a one-time interaction 
Embedded in current 
organization, workplace 
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supervisor behaviors. Although MSF is behavior-based, the behaviors are less 
well organized and specified than those in the assessment center, thus leaving 
some room for the rater’s discretion.  
To cope with information overload, a frequently encountered situation in 
assessment centers, assessors use notes to record behaviors. After each 
exercise, all behaviors recorded will be classified into different dimensions. 
Assessors then assign ratings to dimensions based on observed behaviors either 
before or after discussing their observations with partners. Finally, assessors 
gather together to discuss their ratings on different exercises and assign a final 
rating to each dimension. This well-sequenced process can ensure all relevant 
behaviors are recorded, correctly classified, and appropriately rated and 
integrated. In contrast, note-taking in performance appraisal and MSF is not a 
common practice, although there is an obvious reason for note-taking—recalling 
behaviors that took place long time ago are difficult to remember. MSF also uses 
multiple raters, but these raters are not supposed to pool their observations 
together or discuss their ratings publicly. Therefore, a consensus meeting or 
integration section is usually not available in either performance appraisal or 
MSF. It should be noted that the classification process is not usually present in 
performance appraisal or MSF.  
Performance appraisal and MSF have a much longer timeframe than 
assessment centers. Assessment centers usually take 1-3 days. Assessors rely 
more on short-term memory and notes to organize behaviors and give ratings. 
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With no exception, assessors develop some general impressions about a 
participant too, but these impressions can be easily affirmed or refuted by 
discussion or the behavioral evidence at hand. Performance appraisal and MSF 
have a much longer timeframe, so raters have to rate behaviors that have 
happened up to one year before. DeNisi, Cafferty and Meglino (1984) noted that 
the tendency to recall impressions rather than behaviors will increase over time, 
as raters are more likely to store impressions than behaviors. Particularly, in 
situations of time constraints, cognitive overloading, and insufficient information, 
raters will resort to general impressions formed over the course of numerous 
interactions with the ratee. Such general impressions are difficult to overcome 
(Feldman, 1981). However, research has shown that the relationship between 
rating accuracy and time delay is quite complicated. Heneman and Wexley (1983) 
observed that delayed ratings were less accurate than immediate ratings, but 
several studies (e.g., Barnes-Farrell & Couture, 1984, cited in Ilgen et al., 1993; 
Sanchez & De La Torre, 1996; Sulsky & Day, 1994; Woehr & Huffcutt, 1994) 
have indicated that a delay doesn’t necessarily mean lower rating accuracy, 
although a delay makes recalling behavior less accurate. These studies echo 
DeNisi et al.’s (1984) speculation that in the delay situation, raters rely more on 
their impressions than behavioral memories. Accurate behavior recall may be 
more important to assessment centers as immediate ratings are required 
(Barnes-Farrell & Couture, 1984). 
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One important feature of assessment centers is their high fidelity. Through 
simulations participants can demonstrate their past job-related behaviors. While 
assessment centers provide rich contextual information about simulations, they 
endeavor to minimize social or political influences from current employers. Ideal 
assessors are external psychologists, HR personnel, or managers two levels 
above participants. When mangers one level up must be included, they are not 
allowed to assess their direct reports. These arrangements can greatly minimize 
the impact of participants’ past performance and past interactive experience with 
the assessors. In some cases, assessment centers are conducted off-site to 
avoid possible disturbances. Assessment centers thus can provide a safe and 
fair environment for both assessors and participants. However, performance 
appraisal and MSF embed themselves in rich social contexts. The rater and the 
ratee have been with each other for some time and they will remain with each 
other in the future. Contextual factors, such as quality of leader-member 
exchange (Heneman, Greenberger, & Annonyuo, 1989), expected future 
interactions (Axelrod, 1984; Ilgen & Favero, 1985), task characteristics (Klimoski 
& Donahue, 2001), and national culture (Atwater et al., 2005), may alter the 
rater’s ratings.  
 Table 1 shows that MSF and the assessment center are different in many 
aspects, but this study is more focused on contextual factors. Interestingly, 
neither MSF nor assessment center research pays much attention to contextual 
factors, but for different reasons. Assessment center research has 
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disproportionately concentrated on assessor, content, and process, and 
generally ignores contextual factors, with a belief that they have been controlled. 
There are few studies that take cross-cultural issues into account (Lievens, n.d.). 
One exception, Lievens, Harris, Van Keer, and Bisqueret (2003) studied a 
sample of European executives who were selected to work in Japan, and they 
found that these executives’ performance in a group discussion exercise strongly 
predicted future performance ratings by Japanese supervisors, while a 
presentation exercise failed to make similar predictions. No theory was 
developed to explain such differences. In the same vein, Landy and Farr (1980) 
and Feldman (1981) strongly urged more research on contextual factors in 
performance ratings. Klimoski and Donahue (2001) reviewed many studies that 
focused on contextual factors’ effects on person perception, and developed a 
process model that includes these factors. However, they didn’t specifically 
discuss national culture. Levy and Williams (2004) developed a framework that 
includes numerous contextual factors, but not much work related to national 
culture is reported. To understand how contextual factors (e.g., national culture) 
affect performance ratings, person perception research provides important 
insights. 
Person Perception Research 
Ilgen and Favero (1985) suggested that the constructs and theoretical 
frameworks from person perception research should be valuable to performance 
appraisal research. An example is the leadership perception model developed by 
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Hanges, Lord and Dickson (2000). In Hanges et al.’s model, self-concept plays a 
pivotal role. Self-concept can be referred to a theory of world (Palermo, 1983), 
mental programs (Hofstede, 1998), or motivational mechanisms (Mitchell, 1983). 
According to Hogan and Shelton (1998), self-concept defines a person’s goals, 
aspirations, hopes, dreams, and ideal self-image and determines one’s strategies 
to get along, get ahead, and find meaning.  
Building on their leadership categorization theory (Lord, Foti and DeVader, 
1984), Hanges, Lord and Dickson (2000) developed a new connectionist model 
of leadership perception. The leadership categorization theory states that there 
are multiple leadership prototypes in peoples’ minds and leadership perceptions 
are created through matching an observed leadership behavior to these 
prototypes and then retrieving the most relevant one. The theory provides a 
serial and static account of leadership perception. To reflect the paralleling and 
dynamic nature of the process, Hanges et al. (2000) applied the connectionist 
model to their new leadership perception model. Leadership prototypes now no 
longer have symbolic existence but exist in the flux of widespread connections 
between nodes. Some connections will be more heavily weighted due to 
experience and repetition. The new model is open to various individual and 
contextual influences. Cultural, structural and individual factors exert their 
influences through imposing constraints on self-concept. Lord et al. (2001) stated, 
“Thus, we propose that coherence in leadership perceptions comes from 
satisfying multiple constraints on prototypes that vary, depending upon factors 
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such as national cultures, organizational context, specific tasks, leader qualities, 
perceiver expectations and implicit theories, and immediate history” (p. 314). 
 Lord, Brown, Harvey and Hall (2001) went further to consider multiple 
level issues with their new model. They suggested that the most appropriate level 
of analysis depends on the strongest constraint on the process. When national 
culture becomes salient and acts as a key constraint, the output of the 
connectionist model will be culturally bound and a cultural level of analysis would 
be appropriate. When the dyad of leader and follower becomes salient and is 
conceived as the key constraint, a dyadic level of analysis would be appropriate. 
This multi-level conceptualization of leadership perception is aligned with the 
multi-level view of self-identity (Lord & Smith, 1999; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; 
Markus & Wurf, 1987; Shweder & Sullivan, 1993; Triandis, 1995). The activation 
of the individual, interpersonal and collective self-identity could produce results 
that opt for individual, dyadic, and group level analysis, respectively. Therefore, 
the most appropriate level of analysis depends on the interplay between external 
and internal constraints.  
 Consistency of perceptions across time and/or persons can be achieved if 
strong higher-level constraints are present (Lord et al., 2001). Consistency 
makes aggregation of perceptions across persons possible and a higher level 
analysis legitimate. Therefore, salient external constraints often times justify the 
act of aggregation. Interestingly, leadership behavior itself can be a salient 
constraint that justifies aggregation, because it could have a strong impact on 
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others. Leaders can directly influence subordinates’ self identities, thus resulting 
increased consistency of perceptions among subordinates (Lord & Smith, 1999). 
Leaders can also influence subordinates indirectly through organizational or 
group climate that they foster (Lord et al, 2001). It should be noted that not all 
leaders are influential enough to change other’s self-identity and for some 
organizations and groups a consistent climate may not exist. An individual or 
dyadic level of analysis would be more appropriate, provided that no other 
higher-level constraints are strong. 
 In sum, the connectionist model of leadership perception (Hanges et al., 
2000) provides a useful framework to explain how leadership behavior is 
perceived. The network can be automatic. People may not be conscious of 
culture’s role in the perceiving process. The network is dynamic. It shows how 
goals, values, norms, and affects which originate from different sources (e.g., 
culture, task, leader, follower) impose constraints on the process, and how these 
constraints influence consistency in leadership perceptions and thus define the 
appropriate level of analysis. Thus, the connectionist model can help to link 
extraneous contextual factors, such as national culture, to self-concept (Lord & 
Brown, 2004). Due to its dynamic properties and its capability to account for 
multi-level phenomena, the connectionist model will be adopted to create a new 
conceptual framework of self-other agreement.  
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Weighted-Average Model 
While Hanges et al.’s (2000) connectionist model provides a framework 
that can be used to understand how external and higher-level constructs, like 
national culture, influence person perception through self-concept. Kenny (1991)  
proposed a mathematical model that simulates how factors of acquaintance, 
overlap, consistency, similar meaning systems, unique impression, and 
communication affect perceivers’ consensus. Kenny (1994) expanded the model 
by including three factors that are related to stereotypes, but this study will not 
include them for the sake of simplicity. Kenny’s models provide rich information 
about how these factors function together to influence interpersonal perceptions. 
Six concepts that appeared in Kenny’s (1991) model will be introduced below.  
Based on Kenny’s (1991) weighted-average model, acquaintance predicts 
consensus in the first few interactions, but the relationship will level off quickly. 
This helps to explain King, Hunter and Schmidt’s (1980) notion that the reliability 
of summated ratings for a single supervisor has a ceiling value of .60. Based on 
ratings of 9,975 ratees from 79 organizations, Rothstein (1990) observed a 
curvilinear relationship between rater’s length of exposure to the ratee and 
interrater reliability, which reached to asymptote level at around .60, lending 
strong support to Kenny’s projection. Rothstein also found that lower interrater 
reliability is related to smaller variance in ratings, possibly due to leniency, 
severity, or central tendency biases. When raters have not known the ratee long 
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enough, they may be less confident in rating his/her behaviors, and thus use 
more heuristics to fill the gaps. 
Table 2  
Definitions of Factors in Kenny’s (1991) Weighted-Average Model 
Factor Definition 
________________________________________________________________ 
Acquaintance The amount of information to which the perceiver is exposed 
Overlap The extent to which behaviors are observed by both 
perceivers 








The extent to which perceivers rate the target based on 
extraneous information, such as perceiver’s mood state 
Communication The extent to which perceivers share their perceptions of the 
target with each other 
________________________________________________________________ 
However, such a moderating effect of acquaintance didn’t show up in the 
Bernieri, Zuckerman, Koestner and Rosenthal (1994) study. Length of 
acquaintance was found to be unrelated to the degree of consensus between 
self- and other-ratings of personality traits. Anyhow, this is not unusual when a 
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dichotomous measure is used to predict a curvilinear relationship. In addition, 
Bernieri et al. did observe a moderating effect of cohabitation on personality 
ratings. The longer the cohabitation, the higher the consensus between self- and 
other-ratings. This finding substantiates Kenny’s projection that overlap has 
strong impact on consensus. Long cohabitation gives the rater an opportunity to 
observe a wide array of behaviors, and thus results in higher consensus. Bernieri 
et al. noticed that the cohabitation effect was more prominent for girls than boys. 
This makes intuitive sense as girls in cohabitation usually share more social 
activities together (e.g., shopping) than boys do. Interestingly, the assessment 
center is structured in a way that multiple assessors observe the same set of 
behaviors. According to Kenny, acquaintance is not necessary for consensus 
when overlap is high. Kenny also predicts that when communication between 
raters is not allowed, the maximum limit of rater agreement is constrained by 
similarity between raters. When communication among raters is allowed, rater 
agreement can increase beyond the limit set by rater similarity. Thus, the practice 
of consensus meetings in assessment centers helps assessors to reach 
consensus. 
Funder, Kolar and Blackman (1995) investigated the effects of 
acquaintance, overlap, similarity in meaning systems, and communication. Their 
study showed that raters do not need to be in the same context to agree with 
each other on personality ratings measured by Costa and McCrae’s (1985) NEO 
Personality Inventory (NEO-PI), although being in the same context could make 
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ratings from different raters agree more with each other. Similar ratings do not 
necessarily mean that raters have to observe the same behaviors. Funder et al. 
also found evidence for implicit personality theory, i.e., raters give ratings partly 
based on their own self-images. Therefore, similarity among raters could 
increase agreement in ratings. Funder et al. believed the similarity effect is 
prominent in real life as similarity among raters usually is generally low. 
Nevertheless, some clusters based on geographical, ethnical or socioeconomic 
proximity cannot be ruled out.  
 Another important proposition of Kenny’s (1991) model is that consensus 
and accuracy don’t necessarily co-vary. When there exists a certain degree of 
behavioral consistency and the same behaviors are observed, the more 
behaviors observed the higher the accuracy, even when consensus has reached 
asymptote. If the proposition is correct, the validity of an assessment center 
would increase with more behaviors being sampled. Heneman and Wexley (1983) 
investigated the relationship between the number of behaviors observed and 
rating accuracy in the laboratory setting. They confirmed Kenny’s proposition that 
the more behaviors were observed the more accurate the rating is. Kenny (1991) 
also proposed that communication helps to increase accuracy beyond asymptote, 
especially when the overlap parameter is low. This proposition, once confirmed, 
can also lend support to the integration section of assessment centers, where 
assessors come to share their observations of a participant in different 
simulations.   
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 Kenny’s (1991) weighted-average model has unique value with its strong 
emphasis on behavior. Kenny concluded that judges are indeed accurate in their 
perceptions of targets, and overlap and similarity of meaning systems have the 
strongest impact on consensus among all the factors. However, Kenny also 
considered other factors that might affect the usefulness of the model. For 
example, behavioral consistency might be inflated when ratings are influenced by 
prior acts of the ratee, or when behaviors are sampled from one single situation. 
In addition, acts could be differentially weighted so that first impression or most 
recent acts may have larger effects. Finally, when the timeframe is long, 
behavioral consistency will be lower, as behaviors tend to take place discretely. 
Due to these factors, the ideal weighted-average model may not apply in MSF. 
Nevertheless, the model offers a useful framework to discuss contextual factors’ 
impact on consensus. 
Summary for This Section    
 MSF has been demonstrated to be reliable but its validity is quite 
controversial. The assumption that MSF provides more valid data than 
supervisor-rating is not supported. MSF tackles a small proportion of true 
performance and shows weak level effects, while idiosyncratic rater effects are 
disproportionately high. Such results are disappointing to researchers who hold 
the realistic point of view, while those from the phenomenal camp who endorse 
socially constructed realities view such results more positively. A comparison 
with assessment centers shows that MSF generally does little to control 
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contextual influences and that more research on contextual factors is warranted. 
Research in other fields, such as leadership perception and person perception, 
provides some important insights into MSF research, particularly, to self-other 
agreement. 
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Self-Other Agreement 
Past research has concentrated on how to improve performance appraisal 
accuracy by reducing rating bias, with the assumption that reducing biases 
increases accuracy (Ilgen & Feldman, 1983). Acknowledging the importance of 
accuracy research, Ilgen et al. (1993) conceived that other criteria, such as 
behavioral specificity and perceived fairness, are also important in practice. With 
a belief that the discrepancy view is more appealing, Ilgen et al. (1993) proposed 
a research shift “from rater errors to the discrepancy between ratings and some 
known standard of performance” (p. 353). However, they confessed that such a 
“known standard of performance” is difficult to define. From a self-assessment 
perspective, Ashford (1989) suggested that self-other comparison be a natural 
occurrence in a socially constructed organizational reality, as it provides 
important information concerning one’s fit with the reality. Using other’s opinions 
as an accuracy criterion thus is entirely appropriate. In this sense, self-rating is 
meaningful despite how inaccurate it is. Based on these notions, research on 
self-other agreement represents an important shift of focus in performance 
appraisal. 
 Self-other agreement represents the degree to which individuals see 
themselves as others see them. In order to maintain positive leadership 
perceptions effective leaders must stay attuned with their environment and adjust 
their behavior accordingly (Hanges, Lord & Dickson, 2000). Self-other 
discrepancy may indicate leaders are either out of touch with or insensitive to the 
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environment. It could be an indication of lack of self-monitoring and behavioral 
flexibility. Hogan and Shelton (1998) speculated that high self-monitors are more 
motivated to meet others’ expectations and thus are more “rewarding” to others. 
A meta-analysis conducted by Day, Schleicher, Unckless and Hiller (2002) also 
suggests self-monitoring promotes job performance. Therefore, a positive 
relationship is expected between self-other agreement and performance.  
From the psychometric perspective, MSF researchers (e.g., Fletcher, 
1997; Wohlers & London, 1989) see self-other agreement as an index of self-
awareness. Operationally, self-awareness can be defined as congruence 
between one’s self-assessment of performance and performance viewed by 
other sources, such as supervisors, peers, subordinates, and customers (London 
& Smither, 1995). From the psychometric perspective, several conditions must 
be met to justify self-other agreement research. First, construct validity must be 
present. Second, the process of how the self and others reach agreement should 
be clarified. Finally, the relationship between self-other agreement and other 
variables (e.g., performance) can be predicted by the model.  
Construct Validity of Self-Other agreement 
Past reliability research has focused on either self- or other-ratings, 
instead of the self-other agreement measure itself. One exception is the Nilsen 
and Campbell (1993) study, which reported a test-retest correlation coefficient 
(30 days apart) of .71. Some support for construct validity is also present. Self-
other agreement has been found to be related to measures of self-monitoring 
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(Church, 1997), locus of control and need for achievement (Mabe & West, 1982), 
and conscientiousness (Fletcher, 1997). 
 Mounting evidence has shown that self-other agreement can be used to 
predict performance (Alimo-Metcalfe, 1998; Atwater, Ostroff, Yammarino, & 
Fleenor, 1998; Atwater & Yammarino, 1992; Bass & Yammarino, 1991; Furnham 
& Stringfield, 1994; McCaulley & Lombardo, 1990; Van Velsor, Taylor & Leslie, 
1993). The earliest support dates back to Thornton (1968). He studied 
supervisor-rating and self-ratings on 27 performance variables for the top 
executives of a large company and found that those executives who tended to 
overestimate themselves were least promotable. Bass and Yammarino (1991) 
also noted that their self-insight index of self-enhancement was related to 
promotion and supervisor-ratings of performance. Van Velsor, Taylor, and Leslie 
(1993) observed that over-estimators had the lowest performance, in comparison 
to accurate estimators and under-estimators. By using polynomial regression 
procedures suggested by Edwards (1993), Atwater, Ostroff, Yammarino and 
Fleenor (1998) found that effectiveness rated by supervisors was the highest 
when both self- and other-ratings were high, while effectiveness was the lowest 
when self-ratings were higher than other-ratings. However, Atwater et al. 
cautioned that such relationships might not hold when other criteria were used. 
Atkins and Wood (2002) used objective criteria - assessment center ratings - in 
their study. They found that while self-supervisor ratings predicted assessment 
center results, self-peer ratings failed to make similar predictions. Self-ratings 
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correlated negatively with assessment center results. Therefore, Atkins and 
Wood concluded that the relationship between self-other agreement and 
performance was inflated in the Atwater et al. (1998) study.  
Another line of support is from personality research. Kwan et al.’s (2004) 
study developed a self-enhancement index based on Kenny’s (1994) Social 
Relations Model (SRM). SRM can successfully separate perceiver effects, target 
effects, and their interaction effects, and thus can be used to study consensus 
among perceivers. The self-enhancement index was developed to represent the 
degree of consensus between self-ratings and other-ratings on a personality 
measure. Based on the data from 132 undergraduate students, Kwan et al. 
observed that their self-enhancement index predicted self-esteem positively. No 
relationship existed between the index and relationship harmony, a variable 
representing the extent to which individuals value harmonious relationship. More 
interestingly, the self-enhancement index had a moderate negative relationship 
with task performance that was objectively measured. They commented, “Self-
enhancement bias may have positive consequences for intrapsychic adjustment, 
allowing self-enhancers to feel good about themselves (e.g., self-esteem, 
subjective wellbeing), but not for task performance and interpersonal adjustment 
(e.g., being liked), especially in longer term relationships when initially positive 
impressions may fade over time” (p.106). Overly positive self-evaluations may 
reflect poor social skills and maladjustment, which in turn have short-term and 
long-term negative consequences on mental health (Colvin, Block & Funder, 
 
                                                                                                  
 46 
1995). Thus, the findings from the self-enhancement bias research are consistent 
with those from the self-other agreement research. However, it should be noted 
that the self-other agreement index is contaminated by the perceiver effects 
(Kwan et al., 2004). When strong perceiver effects are present, the relationship 
between self-enhancement and task performance will be attenuated.  
Models of Self-Other Agreement 
The previous review demonstrates that self-other agreement is a reliable 
and meaningful construct, but little theoretical work exists regarding how self-
other agreement is achieved. As few exceptions, Campbell (1985) proposed a 
cognitive process model that portrays how information, cognitive and affective 
constraints lead to self-other discrepancies. Yammarino and Atwater (1993) 
proposed a well-known model of self-perception accuracy. Based on the degree 
of self-other discrepancies, they classified ratees into three categories: over-
estimators, accurate estimators, and under-estimators. They suggested that 
these three categories of ratees would have different individual and 
organizational outcomes. While these models provide some practical guidelines 
to self-other agreement research, they fail to address many important issues. 
First, it is unclear how contextual factors affect self-other agreement. In addition, 
these models are static and linear, failing to account for the dynamism present in 
person perception. Finally, they have difficulty in addressing multi-level issues. 
To overcome these drawbacks, a new framework based on Hanges et al.’s (2000) 
connectionist model is proposed. 
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The Campbell (1985) model. Campbell (1985) proposed that 
discrepancies between employee self-ratings and supervisor-ratings come from 
three sources (see Figure 1). First, employees and supervisors may have 
different understandings of job requirements and goals. Due to information 
constraints, employees usually do not have a clear idea of what supervisors 
expect of him/her. Supervisors should clarify roles to employees in order to 
overcome the information constraints. Second, performance appraisal is a 
process that requires a lot of cognitive resources - to observe, recode, store, 
recall, and integrate behaviors. To reduce cognitive overload, behavioral 
information is usually organized in the form of schema and overall impression is 
retrieved when the supervisor evaluates the employee’s performance. 
Discrepancies appear when the employee and the supervisor have different 
schemas and when they have different interpretations regarding the same 
behavior. Solutions to this problem can include rater training and adopting 
behaviorally anchored scales. Third, the impact of affect becomes salient when it 
gets to the evaluation stage. Subconscious motives may express themselves in 
forms of psychological defensive mechanisms or stereotypes, and the feeling of 
threat or guilt may play in. They color the cognitive processes of both the 
employee and the supervisor. One way to control this affect-based bias is to use 
the ratings for only one purpose. Information constraints, cognitive constraints, 
and affective constraints thus cause discrepancies between the employee’s and 
the supervisor’s ratings.  
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Figure 1. Campbell’s (1985) self-other agreement model. 
 
In addition to the constraints, a feedback loop runs from “self-evaluation of 
job performance” to “employee’s cognitions about job requirements” for the 
employee. When discrepancies exist, employees may choose to either put in 
more effort or lower their expectations. In parallel, a feedback loop goes from 
“supervisor’s evaluation of the employee’s performance” to “supervisor’s 
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discrepancies appear, the supervisor may either modify his/her cognitions about 
the job requirements or demand the focal employee to put in more effort. 
Campbell’s model is straightforward and considers many possible causes of bias, 
such as attribution, psychological defensive mechanisms, and stereotypes. 
However, it pays more attention to intrapersonal factors, thus leaving contextual 
factors unattended. 
The model of self-perception accuracy. Building on Ashford’s (1989) 
framework of self-assessment, Yammarino and Atwater (1993) came up with a 
model of self-perception accuracy to describe self-other agreement and its 
outcomes (see Figure 2). They identified various factors that might influence self-
ratings, other-ratings, and subsequently self-other agreement, but their model 
placed more emphasis on different outcomes resulting from self-other agreement. 
First, self-ratings and other-ratings are determined by self-perceptions and other-
perceptions, respectively. Those factors that might influence self-perceptions and 
other-perceptions, including initial perceptions, individual characteristics, task 
characteristics, and the social environment, were identified and discussed. 
Second, self-ratings and other-ratings form an index of self-other agreement. 
Third, based on the degree of agreement between self-ratings and other-ratings, 
ratees are categorized into three groups: over-estimators, accurate estimators, 
and under-estimators. Fourth, different organizational and individual outcomes 
were suggested for these three groups of ratees.  
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Figure 2. Yammarino and Atwater’s (1993) model of self-perception accuracy. 
 
Over-estimators are defined as individuals whose self-ratings are one-half 
of a standard deviation above other-ratings, accurate estimators are individuals 
whose self-other difference scores are within one-half of a standard deviation of 
other-ratings, and under-estimators are individuals whose self-ratings are one-
half of a standard deviation below other-ratings. According to Yammarino and 
Atwater (1993), over-estimating will lead to diminished outcomes; accurate self 
perception may result in enhanced performance; under-estimators are 
characterized with mixed outcomes. A few studies (Atwater & Yammarino, 1992; 
Bass & Yammarino, 1991; Mabe & West, 1982; McCauley and Lombardo, 1990; 
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Atwater also demonstrated that their categorization did not result from self-rating 























Note: Adopted from Yammarino & Atwater (1993) 
 
                                                                                                  
 51 
higher self-ratings and lower other-ratings, while under-estimators are 
characterized with both lower self-ratings and higher other-ratings (Atwater & 
Yammarino, 1992; Van Veslor et al., 1993).  
The model of self-perception accuracy (Yammarino & Atwater, 1993) 
provides a general framework for MSF researchers to study self-other agreement. 
In comparison to Campbell’s (1985) model, Yammarino and Atwater’s model 
places more emphasis on possible outcomes of self-other agreement, which 
helps to stimulate a strong research interest in this field. However, Yammarino 
and Atwater’s model has two obvious shortcomings. First, it does not delineate 
how self-other agreement is achieved. Second, the model considers contextual 
factors as antecedents of self-perceptions and other-perceptions, stead of the 
self-other agreement process. Atwater and Yammarino (1997) posted some 
updates on their original model. The most significant one was to separate 
accurate raters further into two groups: those with high performance (In-
Agreement/Good) and those with poor performance (In-Agreement/Bad). Despite 
all these updates, the drawbacks that appeared in their original model remain.  
A new conceptual framework. Based on Hanges, Lord and Dickson’s 
(2000) connectionist model and Kenny’s (1991) weighted-average model, a new 
framework of self-other agreement is proposed (see Figure 3). The new 
framework will be able to overcome some shortcomings of the aforementioned 
models of self-other agreement (Atwater & Yammarino, 1997; Campbell, 1988; 
Yammarino & Atwater, 1993). First, the new framework catches the active, 
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dynamic, and nonlinear aspects of the self-other agreement process. Second, 
the new framework offers important insights into how various contextual factors 
affect self-other agreement. Third, the new framework provides a unique 
perspective to understand multi-level phenomena which have been generally 
neglected in MSF research. Finally, the new framework integrates many different 
theories, such cognitive theories, motivation theories, affect theories, and self-
identity theories. The framework basically is a cognitive model that centers on 
self-concept. According to Schein (1990), a cognitive model can provide a useful 
vehicle to understand the process of meaning creation as well as how culture is 
learned. The new framework is generic in the sense that it can be used to 
account for self-other agreement by treating one of the raters as the ratee. The 
model has four elements: behavior, self-concept, rating, and constraint. A 
detailed description of these elements is presented below.  
First, behavior. When a rater and a ratee come to know each other, their 
acquaintance depends on the frequency and the length of time they interact. 
Each dyad is unique. As different raters may interact with the same ratee in 
different circumstances, they will be exposed to different sets of behaviors of the 
ratee. As a result, a rater may observe only a subset of the ratee’s behavior 
repertoire. In Figure 3, two intersecting circles are used to represent two 
behavioral sets. It should be noted that these two behavioral sets may not 
necessarily intersect, as two raters may observe totally different sets of behaviors. 
When the rater is the ratee himself/herself, he/she will have access to the whole 
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behavioral set in theory, while an external rater covers only a proportion of it. The 
way two circles intersect will be slightly different from that in the figure.  
Figure 3. A new conceptual framework of self-other agreement. 
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different contexts and each of which has specific cognitive, emotional, 
motivational, and behavioral consequences” (p. 8). Researchers have shown that 
self-concept has different facets. For example, it can be individual, relational, and 
collective (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Lord, Brown & Freiberg, 1999); it mirrors 
human beings’ motives to get along, get ahead, and find meaning (Hogan & 
Shelton, 1998); it can be separated into self-views, possible selves, and current 
goals (Lord & Brown, 2004; Lord, Brown & Freiberg, 1999). The cognitive, 
motivational, affective processes that lead to rating biases and errors (see 
Klimoski & Donahue, 2001) can also find their habitants in self-concept. 
Third, constraint. There are many contextual constraints but only a few will 
be discussed in the model. DeNisi, Cafferty and Meglino (1984) suggested that 
the purpose for appraisal has a strong influence on different aspects of the 
cognition process. Raters, like tacticians, can adopt different approaches to 
rating (Fiske, 1993). When the goal of rating is aligned between two raters, they 
may take the same strategy, and subsequently have similar ratings. The unit-
level performance also affects performance rating. Keller (1992) suggested that 
team performance would have an impact on the perception of leadership 
behavior. In his study, team performance at Time 1 was found to influence team 
member’s leadership ratings at Time 2. The degree of agreement in performance 
ratings is related to task complexity as well. It has been found that self-other 
agreement in managerial jobs is substantially lower than that for non-managerial 
jobs (Conway & Huffcutt, 1997; Harris & Schaubroeck, 1988). Lord et al. (2001) 
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suggested an indirect way for leaders to influence subordinates is through 
organizational or group climate that they foster. Strong organizational or group 
climate can make ratings from two raters more similar. While these contextual 
factors are important, this study will focus on national culture and the factors in 
Kenny’s (1991) model: acquaintance, overlap, behavioral consistency, similar 
meaning systems, communication, and unique impression.  
Fourth, rating. ratings are given by the raters based on the behaviors they 
observe. The extent of agreement depends on the behavioral sets raters are 
exposed to, differences in raters’ self-concepts, as well as contextual influences. 
Agreement can be represented with two circles that intersect. The larger the 
intersection, the higher the agreement. When self-other agreement is the case, 
the ratee can be categorized into different groups using Yammarino and 
Atwater’s (1993) model of self-perception accuracy and different outcomes will 
follow. As the main object of the current model is to further our understanding of 
how contextual factors influence self-other agreement, outcomes resulting from 
self-other agreement are not included in the model.  
The framework shown in Figure 3 describes how two raters reach 
consensus on a leadership behavior as external observers. The process is quite 
straightforward, with the raters observing, processing, and giving ratings. When 
self-other agreement is the consideration, i.e., one of the raters is the ratee 
himself/herself, the process takes on additional complexity. The ratee can take 
three different approaches to assign himself/herself a rating. First, the ratee 
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observes or recalls his/her own behavior and its impact on others. People usually 
take this approach when there are ambiguities and they are not sure about the 
effects of their behaviors (Kenny, 1994). Second, the ratee rates himself/herself 
based on the feedback from others. People may also communicate directly with 
others and get to know how he/she is doing, when ambiguities arise. While this 
approach is helpful, people seldom ask for feedback from others (Kenny, 1994). 
Third, the ratee resorts to his/her self-concept as source of rating and doesn’t 
have to recall specific behaviors. This happens when people have repeated the 
same behavior over and over again. Managers with a long tenure tend to over-
estimate themselves (Ostroff et al., 2004), perhaps because they have formed 
stable self-perceptions over time and are not able to adapt their self-perceptions 
to the changing environment. It is also possible that ambiguities cannot be 
resolved by observing behavior or communicating with others. Correspondingly, 
there are three possible reasons for self-other discrepancies: the ratee is not able 
to correctly identify the impact of his/her own behaviors; the ratee reports self-
perception directly from the self-concept without relaying it to behaviors; the ratee 
fails to get feedback from others. These reasons are present in both over-
estimators and under-estimators (Yammarino & Atwater, 1993).  
Overestimation may imply deficiency of social skills. Colvin, Block & 
Funder (1995) have suggested that overestimation reflects poor social skills and 
maladjustment. Over-estimators may also have an overly strong self-concept, as 
they tend to pay less attention to how others see them and are more interested in 
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maintaining a positive view of themselves by accepting positive feedback and 
discounting/rationalizing negative feedback (Yammarino & Atwater, 1997). As a 
result, they are more likely to derive ratings from their self-concepts rather than 
observe their own behaviors and ask for feedback from others. In comparison to 
over-estimators, under-estimators are more reserved. They have low aspirations 
and are more satisfied with their current states (Yammarino & Atwater, 1997). 
They don’t necessarily have poor social skills (at least not as poor as over-
estimators) but their self-concepts are quite negative. They are very sensitive to 
feedback from others but pay more attention to negative information, which is 
often consistent with their self-concepts. They tend not to ask for feedback 
proactively as they fear receiving negative feedback. Hence, both over-
estimators and under-estimators may hold themselves back with confined self-
concept and limited communication with others about their performance. Other 
factors may also play a part. For example, a ratee may overestimate to get 
external rewards or avoid punishments, or a ratee may just lack opportunities to 
observe the impact of his/her own behavior or seek feedback from others.  
Summary for This Section    
In sum, self-other agreement has demonstrated itself to be an interesting 
area for research. Self-other agreement is related to such constructs as self 
monitoring, self-awareness, and performance. Two models of self-other 
agreement (Campbell, 1985; Yammarino & Atwater, 1993) are introduced and a 
new conceptual framework is developed, based on the Hanges et al. (2000) 
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connectionist model of leadership perception and the Kenny (1991) weighted-
average model. The new framework helps to overcome several limitations of the 
preceding models. In particular, it is very useful to understand how contextual 
factors, national culture in particular, influence self-other agreement. National 
culture as an important contextual factor has two roles to play in this model. First, 
it helps to shape self-concept and underlying psychological processes. 
Considering the pivotal role self-concept plays in the model and the evidence of 
cross-cultural differences found in self-identity research (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 
1991), it is reasonable to assume that national culture will make a strong impact 
on self-other agreement. Second, culture also affects collective behavioral 
patterns (Kitayama & Markus, 1999; Kitayama, 2002). Such collective behavioral 
patterns will in turn activate different aspects of self-concept and consequently 
affect self-other agreement. Before going any further, the construct of national 
culture will be introduced. 
National Culture 
Culture is an elusive construct that can be subject to different 
understandings. It can be something as profound as basic assumptions (e.g., 
Schein, 1990, 1992) deep in our mind, or something as vivid as routine rituals 
(e.g., Trice & Beyer, 1984). According to Wuthnow and Witten (1988), there are 
two traditions of culture studies, one focusing on explicit products of social 
interaction, another focusing on implicit features of social life. Culture is treated 
as something that is shared in a population. Special patterns and regularities in a 
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population, such as symbols, myths, and discourses, are seen as important 
vehicles through which culture can be studied. On the other hand, the implicit 
camp dives into people’s minds and tries to find special patterns and regularities 
inside. Both camps hold a strong belief that culture is something that exists either 
in the head or out there, and thus can be labeled as the entity view of culture 
(Kitayama, 2002).  
An alternative view, which is more constructivist but not as internally 
cohesive as other views, holds that culture is distributive in nature. A broad 
culture system includes external collective behavioral patterns, reifications, and 
internal psychological structures or processes. Culture is social and historical in 
the sense that people carry it from the past and transmit it to future generations 
collectively. Kitayama (2002) called this perspective the system view of culture. A 
more radical version of this system view is that culture is emergent, and is 
constructed through the “dialog” between the actor and external culture 
manifestations (Meek, 1988). The system view of culture thus indicates a need to 
consider both the historical roots of a culture and its current embodiments, and 
take both implicit and explicit features of social life into account.  
Definition of Culture 
Hofstede’s (1980a) framework of national culture is used in this study, for 
two reasons: (a) it provides a succinct set of dimensions that can be used to 
compare different cultures; (b) it has resulted in a bulk of research that 
contributes to better understanding of national culture and its consequences. 
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Hofstede defined culture as “the collective programming of the mind which 
distinguishes the members of one human group from another” (p. 25). He 
emphasizes that culture is shared among a human group, for example, a nation. 
Hofstede’s definition reflects an implicit view of culture, which takes a subjective 
approach and focuses on norms and values, beliefs and attitudes, and 
mentalities (Wuthnow & Witten, 1988), with an assumption that the implicit or 
informal aspects of the organization can be understood by unraveling the 
psychological processes that give meaning to surface manifestations of culture 
(Ouchi & Wikins, 1985). However, such an entity view of culture is incomplete 
and should be complemented with social and historical analysis (Kitayama, 2002). 
Hofstede (1980a) identified four broad dimensions of national culture 
based on his extensive analysis of the survey data conducted in IBM from 1967 
to 1973, which sampled about 11,600 people across 40 countries. These four 
dimensions are Collectivism-Individualism, Power Distance, Masculinity, and 
Uncertainty Avoidance. The first three dimensions have been consistently 
replicated in different studies using different survey instruments and samples 
(Hofstede & Bond, 1988). The fifth dimension, named Long-Term/Short-Term 
Orientation, was added based on results from studying Chinese values (Chinese 
Culture Connection, 1987). In this study, the fifth dimension will not be discussed 
as its research base is relatively weak and its implications for performance 
appraisal have been rarely discussed. Among the remaining four dimensions, 
only Individualism/Collectivism and Power Distance will be considered in this 
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study, for the following reasons: a) both dimensions concern values that are 
related to group and authority. Individualism/Collectivism and Power Distance 
affect the type of leadership most likely to be effective in a country (Hofstede & 
Bond,1988); b) the dimensions are the most intensively researched dimensions 
(Kirkman, Lowe & Gibson, 2006); c) the U.S. and China differ significantly in 
these two dimensions. For Collectivism/Individualism, the U.S. scores 91, ranking 
No. 1 among dozens of nations, while China scores 11, ranking one of the lowest. 
For Power Distance, the U.S. scores 38 and China scores 80, showing 
substantial differences. Hofstede (1980b) offered definitions for these two 
dimensions:  
Collectivism: Characterized by the tight social framework in which people 
distinguish between in-groups and out-groups; they expect their in-group to look 
after them, and in exchange for that they feel they owe absolute loyalty to it  
Individualism: A loosely knit social framework in which people are 
supposed to take care of themselves and of their immediate families only 
Power Distance: The extent to which a society accepts the fact that power 
in institutions and organizations is distributed unequally  
Culture and Self-Concept 
Culture determines self-concept (Steers & Sanchez-Runde, 2002), and 
becomes part of self-concept through a “mutually constitutive relation” (Kitayama 
& Markus, 1999). Bandura (1999) also stressed the important role the cultural 
context plays in shaping self-concept, and stated, “A sense of selfhood is the 
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product of a complex interplay of social and personal construal process” (p. 230). 
Culture provides important contexts and frames of reference for individuals to 
grow. Individuals who interact with these contexts will develop stable thought and 
behavioral preferences that are unique to the contexts. Over time, such 
preferences “sink” into the unconsciousness world (Bateson, 1972) and 
constitute the implicit aspects of self-concept. As emphasized by Kitayama and 
Markus (1999), self-concept not only holds culture, it also reproduces culture; 
culture not only exists in self-concept, it also exists in collective behavior patterns. 
An easy tendency in culture research is to reduce culture to psychological 
processes and personal knowledge structures, and thus “psychologizing” it 
(Kitayama, 2002). To counter this tendency, it’s necessary to take social and 
historical factors into consideration. 
As contexts or practices are pluralistic and not necessarily cohesive, self-
concept is also composed of loosely organized elements, which have different 
saliency in different circumstances (Bandura, 1999). For example, Markus and 
Kitayama (1991) showed that self-concept can be both independent and 
interdependent, and different selves dominate in different cultures. Triandis (1989) 
investigated how different aspects of the self were sampled in different social 
environments. In a more individualistic culture, the individual self is sampled 
more frequently than the collective self. In a more collectivistic culture, or when 
people are facing external threat, competition with out-groups, and common fate, 
the collective self is sampled more frequently. Cross-cultural studies of self-
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concept have recognized many other differences between individualists and 
collectivists. For example, people in collectivist cultures pay more attention to 
context than content, while people in individualist cultures emphasize content 
over context (Miller, 1984; Cousins, 1989; Triandis, 2000). Thus, culture 
determines which aspect of the self or the environment is attended to. In turn, the 
self determines which needs are salient (Haslam, Powell & Turner, 2000). 
Striving for self-actualization and enhancing self-esteem become dominant 
needs when the individual self is salient, while the needs to enhance group-
based self-esteem and to achieve group goals dominate when the collective self 
is salient. Therefore, culture can influence perception or behavior through self-
concept and needs that tie to self-concept. 
Chinese Culture and Workplace 
Chinese culture is characterized by strong in-group collectivism. In 
studying cooperative behavior in different cultures, Chen, Chen, and Meidal 
(1998) claimed, “Group membership carries stronger psychological attachment 
for collectivists than for individualists. In Japan or China, for instance, such 
memberships as schools, geographical origins, or family names are more likely 
to trigger sufficient mutual identification to serve as a solid basis for emerging 
cooperation” (p. 293). Such group attachment can be traced back to familism 
highly valued by Confucius (Hofstede & Bond, 1988).  
Around 500 B.C., Confucius, the most famous philosopher in ancient 
China, traveled across the nation to promote his philosophies. He proposed the 
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family should act as the prototype of the society and the order of society could be 
established by mirroring those mutually obligated and highly structured family 
relationships between father and son, elders and youngsters, and husband and 
wife. By specifying the roles and role relationships, Confucians were able to 
place individuals in a strict vertical structure. To make this structure work, 
individuals must be socialized into appropriate roles, and success was defined as 
the capability to attune to and meet the expectations of such roles. Confucians 
then promoted virtues that individuals should practice, such as compassion, 
loyalty, trust, righteousness, etiquette, kinship, moral integrity, filial piety, 
industriousness, thrift, perseverance, humility, tolerance, and empathy. People 
were advised to restrain their desires and needs, refrain from hedonism, and 
control their temper, in order to practice these virtues. Meanwhile, people were 
not encouraged to express their individualist selves in front of a group/family as 
the harmony of the group/family would be in jeopardy. Confucian teachings have 
strongly influenced Chinese culture for more than 2000 years.  
The interdependent or the collective self will be constantly called on 
through role demands and expectations in a collectivist culture (Smith, 1983). 
Chinese people place great importance on anticipated reactions of others to their 
behavior (Yang, 1981). Their main achievement goals are honoring the clan and 
glorifying the ancestors (Yu & Yang, 1994). Here, the clan refers to an in-group 
that could consist of family, extended family, or extended relationships. Individual 
success is defined as being able to meet the expectation of the clan and promote 
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the clan’s reputation. Being unable to fulfill the expectations may ruin the 
reputation of the clan and bring shame to the whole clan. In a Chinese 
expression, when a clan wins or loses, everyone in the clan will either earn or 
lose face, or mien-tzu (see Ho, 1976; Redding & Ng, 1983). The concern for 
mien-tzu exerts a mutually coercive power upon the members of a social network 
(Yau, 1986). Mien-tzu, or glories of a clan, can be accumulated, sustained, and 
reinforced through many ways, such as showing off luxury goods. Therefore, 
individuals from a collectivist culture have a strong obligation to meet other 
people’s expectations and safeguard the reputation of the clan they are from. To 
fulfill external role demands, Chinese leaders must be more concerned with 
others’ perceptions of themselves.  
In China, institutions like teams, organizations and even the society have 
their roots in the family. Supervisors are supposed to display paternalism and 
safeguard all the interest of members, while subordinates will then reciprocate 
with compliance. It also makes intuitive sense that high collectivism should 
promote cooperation and teamwork as collectivists are more inclined to strive for 
super ordinate goals and place the group-identity ahead of the self-identity (Chen, 
Chen & Meindl, 1998; Kirkman, Lowe, & Gibson, 2006). However, such ideal 
situations are the exception rather than rule, as the Chinese workplace is far from 
unitary. In fact, Japan is the only nation that carries the collectivist culture over 
into its companies (Tayeb, 1994). Unlike Japanese organizations, Chinese 
organizations are characterized by clear boundaries between levels due to high 
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power distance. Employees form different in-groups which could either include 
members from the same level or across different levels. The workplace is thus 
compartmentalized into different cliques. Such cliques become an important form 
of social life, even out of the workplace. Dissimilar realities may be created 
because of intensive interaction and communication within a clique. The 
existence of multiple realities casts doubt on whether there exists a truth. “He 
(Confucius) dealt with Virtue, but left the question of Truth open” (Hofstede & 
Bond, 1989, p. 19). Chinese leaders have to maintain a subtle balance among 
multiple realities, which requires outstanding social skills (Hogan & Shelton, 
1998).  
Culture undergoes constant changes, especially when there are changes 
in labor mobility patterns and social movements (Earley & Gibson, 1998). The 
relationship between culture and the self is very dynamic (Kitayama & Markus, 
1999). The self not only reproduces culture, it also changes it. Hofstede and 
Bond (1988) noticed that Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and South Korea, which 
had enjoyed substantial economic growth from 1965 to 1985, placed more value 
on some Confucian virtues (e.g., thrift, persistence, shame, and authority/order), 
while devaluing some others (e.g., steadiness and stability, giving face, respect 
tradition, reciprocity). Ralston et al. (1999) compared three generations of 
Chinese Managers and found the new generation was becoming more 
individualistic and less collectivistic. The pace of such changes may accelerate 
due to globalization and new technology development. 
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Globally Dispersed Teams and Culture 
 Globalization and new technology development also makes working 
across nations a necessity. While expatriate assignment remains as an important 
form of international human resource management, more and more people 
across the world work in the same team and do not need to leave their home 
countries. Such work teams can be called “globally dispersed teams” (GDTs).  
 Many challenges exist for GDTs, such as differences in geography, 
language, and culture, among which cultural barriers could be the most difficult to 
overcome. People from different cultures have different beliefs and see things 
through different frames of reference, easily resulting in miscommunication, 
conflict, and even distrust (Baba, Gluesing, Ratner, & Wagner, 2004). Usually, it 
is rare for people to bring the cultural context into awareness and discuss it 
openly (Cramton, 2001). Leaders of GDTs must take the responsibility, work 
through different cultures, and promote cultural integration in the team (Black & 
Mendenhall, 1990). Many different skills or personal characteristics that can help 
people better perform in foreign cultures have been identified, such as 
flexibility/adaptability, relational skills, interpersonal skills, extra-cultural openness, 
job knowledge and motivation, perceptual skills, and self-efficacy (Arthur & 
Bennett, 1995; Black, Mendenhall, & Oddou, 1991; Mendenhall & Oddou, 1985). 
Equipped with these skills and characteristics, people can communicate better 
and improve performance accordingly.     
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Summary for This Section    
 This section shares Kitayama’s (2002) system view of culture, which 
states that culture exists both in the head and out there. It is suggested that there 
exists a reciprocal relationship between culture and self-concept. While culture 
plays a critical role in shaping self-concept, self-concept also reproduces and 
transforms culture (Kitayama & Markus, 1999). The U.S. and China have very 
different cultures, with the former being high on individualism and low on power 
distance and the latter being high on collectivism and high on power distance. A 
historical description of the Chinese culture further shows that it features familism, 
status, Confucian virtues, in-group, and mien-tzu. The Chinese workplace is 
usually compartmentalized into different cliques, resulting from in-group practices 
and status differences. Globally dispersed teams (GDTs) are characterized with 
team members from different cultures working together in different nations. 
Cultural diversity poses enormous challenges to GDT leaders, because they 
have to work across cultural boundaries. People from different cultural 
backgrounds may have different perceptions of their leadership effectiveness. 
Self-other agreement becomes harder to achieve. The next section will discuss 
the relationship between culture and self-other agreement. 
Culture and Self-Other Agreement 
With a belief that culture will affect self-other agreement, Atwater et al. 
(2005) compared self-other agreement between the U.S. and several European 
nations and found that the relationship between self-other agreement and 
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performance differed across cultures. An important finding is that French 
differentiated high performers less well than their U.S. counterparts, possibly due 
to the leveling effects unique in the French culture. With a more feminine culture, 
French do not try to be better than others. Atwater et al. urged research in other 
cultural contexts with higher collectivism scores, believing that self-other 
agreement would be more strongly influenced by Individualism/Collectivism.  
Culture can affect self-other agreement in two ways. A more direct way is 
through self-concept or meaning systems. A rater and a ratee from two cultures 
may have different schemas of effective leadership behavior and thus perceive 
the same behavior differently. For example, in a globally dispersed team (GDT), 
a supervisor from an individualist culture may believe autonomy is important and 
subordinates should make their own decisions, but subordinates from a 
collectivist culture may perceive the supervisor’s behaviors less plausible as 
he/she is supposed to take the responsibility to make the decision for them. 
Subordinates may see the supervisor as indecisive. Such different schemas 
could cause self-other discrepancies. The other, less direct way is through 
collective behavioral patterns (Kitayama & Markus, 1999; Kitayama, 2002) that 
are unique to each culture. For example, a supervisor in a high power distance 
culture may hesitate to solicit feedback from subordinates (Smith et al., 1994), 
which in turn results in self-other discrepancies. Kenny’s (1991) weighted-
average model provides a convenient framework to investigate cultural effects 
through collective behavioral patterns. 
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The U.S. and China 
This study attempts to understand the relationship between self-other 
agreement and performance in the U.S. and China. Within each culture, the self-
concept will be more similar than different. Hence, discussion will focus on 
collective behavior patterns. Table 3 lists culture’s possible impact on Kenny’s 
(1991) factors. In the table, a high collectivism/high power distance (H/H) culture 
is contrasted to a low collectivism/low power distance (L/L) culture. The former is 
represented by China while the latter corresponds to the U.S. A plus sign 
represents a culture that may promote a factor; a minus sign represents a culture 
that may constrain a factor; “mixed” represents a culture that either promotes or 
constrains a factor. 
Acquaintance refers to the amount of information the rater has about the 
ratee. Kenny’s (1991) projected that acquaintance will have a large effect on 
consensus when people get to know each other but the effect levels off pretty 
quickly. Considering a one-year timeframe, acquaintance will have a relatively 
small impact on self-other agreement. High collectivism is associated with more 
positive attitudes toward teams (Kirkman et al., 2006), but high power distance 
keeps the leader far from subordinates hierarchically speaking (Bochner & 
Hesketh, 1994). On the contrary, individualists prefer to work alone (Earley, 1993; 
Jung & Avolio, 1999), but low power distance creates fewer barriers for them to 
interact with their supervisors. Overall, raters from both cultures should have 
adequate behavioral information to rate the ratees.  
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Table 3  




Low Power Distance 
Collectivism/ 
High Power Distance 
_______________________________________________________________ 
Acquaintance Mixed Mixed 
Behavioral Consistency + - 
Overlap + - 
Similar Meaning Systems + - 
Communication + - 
Unique Impression - + 
________________________________________________________________ 
It has been speculated that the individual identity is salient in an 
individualist culture, while in a collectivist culture the collective identity is salient 
(Lord & Brown, 2004). When the individual identity dominates, a person will 
display more behavioral consistency, but less will be expected for collectivists 
(Cousins,1984; Kitayama & Markus, 1999). In a H/H culture, people tend to 
demonstrate different behavioral patterns according to status and relationship 
patterns. In-group practices and status differences compartmentalize the 
workplace so that the rater can only observe limited behaviors of the ratee. The 
ratee is also supposed to adjust their behaviors to different raters and situations. 
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Therefore, raters are less likely to observe the same behavior of a ratee in a H/H 
culture in comparison to those in a L/L culture. 
In-group practices and status differences make leadership behavior less 
observable and less consistent, and they also affect how the observed behaviors 
are perceived by different raters. The fundamental assumption of MSF (Murphy & 
Cleveland, 1995) is that different meaning systems exist across levels in the 
same culture. However, support for this statement is generally weak (e.g., Mount 
et al., 1998; Scullen et al., 2000; Yammarino, 2003). Raters from different levels 
seem to have similar understandings of effective performance. Nevertheless, it 
should be noted that most studies cited are based on U.S. participants, who 
come from a L/L culture. It is possible that in a L/L culture people are more 
inclined to use the same external standards for rating than those in a H/H culture. 
Also, consistent expectations or standards are better communicated in a low 
power distance culture. In a H/H culture, however, different realities may exist 
because in-group practices and status differences tend to compartmentalize the 
workplace into cliques. Different realities correspond to different meaning 
systems.  
Communication makes consensus more likely (Kenny, 1991). In a L/L 
culture, people communicate expectations and seek feedback directly (Sully De 
Lique & Sommer, 2000). Direct communication helps to increase self-other 
agreement. In contrast, people tend not to communicate expectations and 
feedback explicitly in a H/H culture. Bochner and Hesketh (1994) noted that in a 
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high power distance culture subordinates are less open with their superiors. 
Seeking feedback could bear face costs and people use monitoring and indirect 
inquiry feedback-seeking strategies (Sully De Lique & Sommer, 2000). In the 
same vein, giving others feedback could be risky as others may feel 
embarrassed, especially when the feedback is conducted across levels and 
between cliques. With constrained communication between the rater and the 
ratee, self-other agreement will be more difficult to achieve in a H/H culture. But 
when both raters are from the same clique, consensus is much more likely due to 
intensified communication in a clique.  
Unique Impression refers to the degree to which the rater uses information 
other than observed behaviors. Table 2 suggests that a H/H culture would incur 
more unique impression. High power distance makes behavior less observable 
so people in a H/H culture are more likely to go to their in-group for information. 
As a result, the rater bases his/her ratings on perceptions learned from others 
instead of behaviors they actually observe. In addition, leaders in a collectivist 
culture usually have more informal contact with fellow workers than those in an 
individualist culture (Bochner & Hesketh, 1994). Due to in-group practices and 
status differences in the Chinese workplace, leaders may develop disparate 
personal relationships with their subordinates. Such informal contact or personal 
relationship can introduce unique impression to the rating process. In contrast 
people from a L/L culture will rely more on independent judgment, with less 
influence from others.  
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Globally Dispersed Teams 
 Unlike the U.S. or China, globally dispersed teams (GDTs) are 
characterized by heterogeneous cultures, which may exert a negative influence 
on self-other agreement. Because different cultures provide different lenses or 
views of the world, people with different origins may perceive the same behavior 
of a leader differently. As a result, self-other agreement will be more difficult to 
achieve. The more cultures a team has and the more different these cultures are, 
the lower self-other agreement can be.  
With multiple cultures in a team, collective behavior patterns will be less 
consistent and their impact on self-other agreement will be less systematic. For 
example, a manager from an individualist culture may demonstrate high 
behavioral consistency to his/her team, while another manager from a collectivist 
culture may attempt to meet others’ expectations by displaying different 
behaviors. Thus, behavioral consistency may vary in different GDTs. Culture’s 
impact on acquaintance, overlap, communication, and unique impression is 
similarly equivocal. To better understand the effects of these factors on self-other 
agreement and consensus between raters, there is a need to take geographical, 
language, and technological elements into consideration. Geographical and 
language differences suggest less communication and less unique impression 
while use of standard communication processes and technologies suggests 
increased overlap.   
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Summary for This Section    
In sum, this section introduces two ways in which culture can influence 
self-other agreement. First, people from different cultures will experience more 
difficulty to reach consensus on ratings, due to different schemas they have. 
Second, culture influences self-other agreement through collective behavioral 
patterns. Table 2 indicates that raters in a H/H culture have particular difficulty in 
giving ratings that are in agreement with the ratee, due to lower behavioral 
consistency, less overlap, compartmentalized meaning systems, restricted 
communication, and more unique impression. As a result, self-other agreement 
will be harder to achieve in a H/H culture than in a L/L culture. In GDTs, the 
existence of multiple meaning systems makes achieving self-other agreement 
more difficult. However, behavioral consistency, overlap, communication, and 
unique impression are less impacted by culture than geographical, language, and 
technological factors. Based on these new insights, several research hypotheses 
will be presented in the next section. 
Research Question and Hypotheses 
MSF has attracted more and more research attention during the past 15 
years but practitioners and researchers are still perplexed by the rating 
discrepancies between different sources, especially, self-other discrepancies. 
Recent research has shown that such discrepancies are stable and they predict 
actual performance. Overestimation corresponds to lower performance while 
ratings in agreement predict higher performance. However, little work exists 
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regarding how the rater and the ratee come to agreement on their ratings. 
Moreover, as MSF expands into the global arena, self-other agreement becomes 
a bigger concern. So far, little is known about culture’s role in self-other 
agreement. This study aims to develop a conceptual framework that describes 
how the rater and the ratee reach agreement and how contextual factors affect 
the process. Heavily borrowed from person perception literature, a conceptual 
framework is developed based on Hanges et al.’s (2000) connectionist model of 
leadership perception and Kenny’s (1991) weighted-average model. Culture is 
built in as an important contextual factor that affects self-other agreement. This 
study also compares samples from the U.S., China, and GDTs to investigate how 
self-other agreement is different in different cultural contexts. 
The U.S. and China 
It has been suggested that Chinese leaders are more concerned with 
others’ perceptions of themselves in order to meet other people’s expectations. 
However, it’s also suggested that the Chinese workplace is more than unitary. It 
is often compartmentalized into multiple realities. Chinese leaders need to strike 
a delicate balance among these realities and manage a coherent outlook to each. 
Success often depends on whether the collective self has been transcended 
beyond the clique and whether commitment to superordinate goals and the group 
identity has been invoked (Chen et al., 1998). Charismatic and participative 
leadership is highly valued in a collectivist culture (Kirkman, et al., 2006), as it 
helps to promote social identify and satisfy employees’ need for group-based 
 
                                                                                                  
 77 
self-esteem (Haslam et al., 2000). Good leaders will be those who can respond 
resourcefully to various role demands and gain unanimous commitment from 
different constituents.  
Self-other agreement is more likely for people who care about others’ 
perceptions than for those who are self-focused. The collective self is more 
loosely organized and less independent than the individual self (Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991). As a result, people from a collectivist culture are less likely to 
derive ratings directly from the self-concept than those from an individualist 
culture. That is, people from a collectivist culture may focus more on behaviors 
when they conduct self-ratings. With more emphasis on behavior than the self-
concept, self-other agreement could improve. However, collectivists are less 
likely to communicate with others about their performance, which might decrease 
self-other agreement. In addition, because collectivists tend to demonstrate 
different behaviors in different contexts, they may at times have problem in rating 
their own behaviors accurately, resulting in lower self-other agreement. Overall, I 
propose: 
 H1: The correlations between self-ratings and other-ratings (supervisors, 
subordinates, and peers) will be lower in the U.S. than those in China.  
In contrast, a compartmentalized organizational reality may make 
consensus between raters more difficult to achieve. The ratee may demonstrate 
different behaviors in different situations and raters may observe a small set of 
the ratee’s behaviors. Moreover, multiple meaning systems may exist and raters 
 
                                                                                                  
 78 
may form unique impression through informal interactions with the ratee. Finally, 
communication is usually restricted between cliques. As a result, rating 
consensus between others will be lower in a H/H culture than in a L/L culture. 
Performance will become less critical in determining ratings when multiple 
realities exist. Therefore, I propose: 
H2: The correlations between other-ratings, including supervisor-ratings of 
performance, will be higher in the U.S. than those in China. 
Overestimation has been found to predict poorer performance in the L/L 
culture (Atwater & Yammarino, 1997; Van Veslor et al., 1993; Yammarino & 
Atwater, 1993). Seeing oneself better than how others see him/her could be 
especially problematic in a H/H culture. A major challenge for leaders from a H/H 
culture is to meet the expectations of different cliques. As the expectations are 
often inconsistent, and sometimes even in conflict, leaders need to manage them 
artfully so that harmony can be achieved. Failing to do so may result in backfiring 
from those cliques whose expectations are not met. Overestimation may indicate 
that the ratee pays little attention to the expectations of others, lacks social skills 
to present others a coherent impression, is overly contented with himself/herself, 
or is discounting negative feedback. Over-estimators will have difficulty to meet 
intensive role demands and earn others’ support. As result, their performance will 
greatly suffer. Therefore, I propose:  
H3: Overestimation (self-ratings > other-ratings) will be associated with 
poorer supervisor-rating of performance in China as compared with the U.S. 
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In contrast, the relationship between underestimation and performance is 
mixed (Atwater & Yammarino, 1997; Yammarino & Atwater, 1993). 
Underestimation may reflect that the ratee has low self-worth (Yammarino & 
Atwater, 1997).  However, In a H/H culture, underestimation is also associated 
with such Confucian virtues as hardworking, perseverance, humility, tolerance, 
and empathy. Underestimation may indicate the ratee can effectively respond to 
other’s expectations, although may not necessarily be able to meet various role 
demands and gain others’ support. Overall, I propose:    
H4:  Underestimation (self-ratings < other-ratings) will be associated with 
poorer managerial performance in the U.S. as compared with China.  
Globally Dispersed Teams 
Another major concern for MSF is about its effectiveness in globally 
dispersed teams (GDTs), where people are working together across national 
boundaries. Working in multiple locations and with multiple cultures makes 
performance appraisal difficult for teams to carry out. MSF is a promising 
alternative as it take multiple perspectives into consideration. Based on the 
framework developed in this study, it is possible to investigate how geographical 
and cultural factors influence the MSF process. Research on MSF application in 
GDTs can not only show us whether MSF is applicable in another setting, but 
also further our understanding of culture’s role in self-other agreement.  
As GDTs are often constituted by people from different cultures, members 
usually have different meaning systems. Dissimilar meaning systems makes 
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reaching self-other agreement particularly difficult, especially when there are 
additional language and geographical barriers. Therefore, I propose: 
H5: The correlations between self-ratings and other-ratings (supervisors, 
subordinates, and peers) will be higher in the U.S. than those in GDTs.  
It may be counterintuitive but geographical and technological factors may 
actually help to increase consensus between raters, despite dissimilar meaning 
systems. GDTs use more virtual communication tools such as emails and 
conference calls, which usually are highly structured for the sake of efficiency 
and effectiveness. As demonstrated above in the discussion of assessment 
centers, consensus between raters can improve in a more structured situation, 
where contextual factors are under control. Unlike in physical workplaces, where 
individual face-to-face interactions are the norm, in virtual situations people often 
receive the same emails or attend the same conference calls. Overlap can be 
actually higher in this situation than traditional face-to-face situations. In addition, 
using technologies may also constrain how information is delivered, which could 
actually result in more consistency in terms of a leader’s behavior. Finally, 
without intense personal connections or interactions, unique impression will be 
lower, meaning that raters will focus more on behavior and performance when 
they do ratings. Therefore, I propose: 
H6: The correlations between other-ratings, including supervisor-ratings of 
performance, will be similar in the U.S. and GDTs. 
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In globally dispersed teams, a ratee usually has fewer opportunities to 
observe other’s reactions to his/her behavior face-to-face and communicate with 
others about his/her performance, so it will take extra effort to achieve self-other 
agreement. Overestimation may reflect a ratee’s inability to understand his own 
behavior in another cultural setting or communicate about her own performance 
across cultures. As a result, ratings may be heavily influenced by the self-
concept which is overly optimistic. Being open and non-judgmental is important in 
working with people from other cultures (Mendenhall & Oddou, 1985). A 
tendency to be self-contented and cut oneself off from feedback may result in 
poor performance. Therefore, I propose: 
H7: Self-other overestimation (self-ratings > other-ratings) will be 
associated with poorer managerial performance in globally dispersed teams as 
compared with the U.S.  
In contrast, under-estimators tend to be sensitive to cultural differences 
and take them seriously. They will try to understand the effects of their behaviors 
in another cultural setting. Once there is an issue, they will put in extra effort to 
address it. However, underestimation may also reflect low self-efficacy, which 
may reflect poor adjustment to different cultures (Black, Mendenhall, & Oddou, 
1991). According to Black et al., poor adjustment to different cultures may be 
exacerbated when feedback is in short supply. Therefore, I propose:   
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H8: Self-other underestimation (self-ratings < other-ratings) will be 
associated with poorer managerial performance in globally dispersed teams 
when compared to teams in the U.S.  
 





Data were collected from managers in the U.S., China, and globally 
dispersed teams (GDTs) who participated in a leadership development program. 
As part of each program, the manager, his/her supervisor(s), peers, and 
subordinates completed a multi-rater feedback instrument. A total of 1000 
managers who identified themselves as non-expatriates and their work country 
as the U.S. were randomly sampled from a data base with more than 27,000 
managers. Those with both self-rating and supervisor-rating scores missing were 
removed from the original sample, leaving the final sample size of the U.S. 
sample to 818. A total of 428 managers who were from mainland China, Hong 
Kong, and Taiwan formed another sample, with those who had neither 
subordinate-rating scores nor peer rating scores being excluded. Finally, a total 
of 871 managers who were part of globally dispersed teams formed the GDT 
sample. To be included in the GDT sample, a manager must have had at least 
40% of his/her raters from nations other than his/her working nation. For 
subordinate- and peer-ratings, at least two respondents were required; otherwise 
ratings were treated as missing. In the Chinese sample, the number of raters 
ranged from 4 to 26, with a median of 9. About 18% of managers had only one or 
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no subordinates rating them, and about 8% of them had one or no peers rating 
them. In the U.S. sample, the number of raters ranged from 2 to 23, with a 
median of 10. About 13% of managers had one or no subordinates rating them; 
about 6% of them had one or no peers rating them. For the GDT sample, the 
number of raters ranged from 2 to 30, with a median of 11. About 8% of 
managers had one or no subordinates rating them, and about 4% of them had 
one or no peers rating them. For all three samples, it was typical that a manager 
had one supervisor rater, 3 subordinate raters, and 4 peer raters.    
In the U.S. sample, 66% of the managers were male, the average age 
was 44 years, 87% were white, 80% had bachelor degrees or above, 60% were 
at the level of middle management or higher. In the Chinese sample, 66% were 
male, the average age was 41 years, 86% had bachelor degrees or above, 53% 
were at the level of middle management or higher. In the GDT sample, 77% were 
male, the average age was 43 years, 87% had bachelor degrees or above, 68% 
were at the level of middle management or higher. Based on available data, all 
three samples covered a wide range of industries, with relatively more 
participants from Banking and Finance, Electrical/Electronics, Retail Trade, and 
Light Manufacturing. The GDT sample consisted of more participants from the 
banking and finance industry than the other two samples. A wide range of 
functions were covered in all three samples. Relatively more participants were 
from Sales, Finance/Accounting, Marketing, and Operations. Overall, these three 
samples were comparable in terms of industry and function distributions.  
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Measures 
 In this study, both independent and dependent variables were derived 
from the Profilor, a multirater feedback instrument developed by Personnel 
Decisions International Corporation (Hezlett, Ronnkvist, Holt, & Hazucha, 1997) 
to collect competency/performance ratings. The independent variables were self- 
and other-ratings of leadership and the dependent variable was supervisor-
ratings of overall performance.  
The Profilor 
The Profilor contained 135 items, grouped by the publisher into 24 scales, 
i.e. 24 competencies. These competencies drew heavily on the Campbell, 
Dunnette, Lawler and Weick (1970) research but were updated in 1990 to reflect 
the changing nature of managerial work. The development of the Profilor was a 
rigorous process. It is based on several decades of consulting experience and 
research on management, including an extensive review of the management and 
psychology literatures, exhaustive analysis of the large Management Skills 
Profile (MSP) data base that included more than 20,000 managers, thorough job 
analysis, group interviews with hundreds of managers representing many 
functional areas and most major industries, and pilot testing. The Profilor was 
intended to represent behavioral performance competencies that were generally 
required of managers in a changing business environment. The instrument was 
designed to identify interactive transformational leadership which paid special 
attention to team and participative leadership.  
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Respondents were told that the surveys were for gathering feedback 
information for the manager’s development only and confidentiality was assured. 
First, respondents (except supervisors) were anonymous. Second, ratings were 
aggregated for each perspective, so no individual responses could be identified. 
Third, only the manager being rated would see the aggregated results. The 
process of filling out the feedback survey was quite simple. Respondents would 
receive an electronic invitation from the focal manager and they just needed to 
get online and complete the survey step by step as instructed. 
All surveys were in English. Most managers and respondents from China 
and globally dispersed teams worked in multinational companies and English 
was their working language. The survey adopted a 5-point scale that indicated 
the frequency with which the manager engaged in each behavior. The response 
scale ranged from 1 (not at all) to 5 (to a very great extent). When respondents 
didn’t feel they had enough opportunity to observe a certain behavior, they could 
choose “Not Applicable”. Items were short behavioral descriptions, such as 
“Clearly expresses ideas and concepts in writing” and “Recognizes and utilizes 
the contributions of people from diverse backgrounds.” There were three 
additional open-ended questions concerning what the focal manager had done 
effectively, what new skills or behaviors could make him/her more effective, and 
what other suggestions could promote his/her insight and development.  
The Profilor had adequate reliability and validity. Each competency 
consisted of 4-9 items, with internal consistency reliability (Cronbach’s alphas) for 
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self-rating ranging from .65 to .83, supervisor-rating from .75 to .89, subordinate-
rating from .85 to .94, and peer-rating from .82 to .93. Higher reliability existed for 
subordinate-rating and peer-rating because usually more subordinates and peers 
responded to the survey than supervisors. Another reliability index, interrater 
reliability, could be more relevant in MSF as the main concern was whether 
different raters agreed on a certain behavior in terms of rating. Intraclass 
correlation coefficients based on three raters ranged from .47 to .60 for peers 
and from .48 to .61 for subordinates, lending further support for the reliability of 
the Profilor. Intraclass correlation coefficients for supervisors were not available 
as in very few cases the number of supervisors would go over 2.  
Some evidence of validity was also offered. Ratings correlated from .55 
to .84 with overall performance which was based on a five-item performance 
measure. Ratings were also found to be related to competence and long-range 
potential/promotability, which were measured in the beginning of the survey.  The 
competence measure was assessed by one item: “How would you rate this 
manager’s competence in his/her current position?” It was evaluated on a 7-point 
scale ranging from 1 (“Outstanding; one of the best”) to 7 (“Very weak; one of the 
worst”). The potential measure was also assessed by one item: “How would you 
rate this manager’s long-term potential in his/her career?” It was evaluated on 
multiple levels ranging from Senior Executive to First-Line Management. The 
correlations between ratings and competence and potential were moderate to 
high.  
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Leadership Ratings 
In this study, only seven competencies that assessed leadership were 
used, which was consistent with the Atwater et al. (2005) study. These seven 
competencies were related to directing, influencing, motivating, leading 
courageously, fostering teamwork, coaching and developing, and championing 
change. Factor analyses showed that there was one factor underlying these 
competencies, regardless of the sample source or the perspective. These seven 
competencies were added up to form an overall leadership measure. The internal 
consistency coefficients (Cronbach’s alpha) of the overall leadership measure for 
each perspective across samples ranged from .93 to .98, indicating that the new 
measure was highly reliable. 
Performance Ratings 
Supervisor-ratings of a five-item performance measure were used as an 
outcome measure. The items were: “gets the job done”, “is an effective manager 
overall,” “get the work done on time,” “produces high quality work,” and 
“accomplishes a great deal.” These items were rated on a 5-point scale. Using 
the supervisor-rating as a criterion was reasonable as it’s the most reliable and 
valid measure among ratings from different sources (Conway & Huffcutt, 1997). 
The internal consistency reliability coefficients (Cronbach’s alphas) for the U.S., 
the Chinese, and the GDT samples were .88, .87, and .85, respectively.  
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Data Analysis 
Two procedures were used to test the hypotheses. An EQS procedure 
was used to test the equality of the covariance matrices derived from two 
different samples. A polynomial regression procedure was used to explore the 
relationship between self-other agreement and performance in each culture. But 
before applying the polynomial regression procedure, a multivariate regression 
procedure that used self-other ratings as dependent variables (Edwards, 1995) 
was adopted to investigate whether demographic variables played a role in self-
other agreement. 
The EQS Procedure 
Instead of testing correlation coefficients across samples one by one, the 
EQS procedure was able to test the correlation coefficients in two samples 
simultaneously by constraining all or some of the covariances to equal. The EQS 
procedure would compare the observed covariances to those predicted in the 
specified model. It provided many fit indices that could indicate whether the 
model specified (with all covariance being constrained to equal) was accepted or 
refuted. These indices included chi-square, Goodness-of-Fit Index (GFI), 
Adjusted Goodness-of-Fit Index (AGFI), Comparative Fit Index (CFI), 
Standardized Root Mean Square Residuals (RMSR), Root Mean Square Error of 
Approximation (RMSEA), and so on. The chi-square value reflected the 
discrepancy between the modeled covariance matrix and the observed 
covariance matrix. A good model fit required the chi-square value to reach non-
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significance, but a model might still be accepted based on other indices despite a 
significant chi-square value, due to its sensitivity to sample size. GFI was a 
classic fit index that represented how much the observed covariances were 
accounted for by the covariances implied by the model. GFI could be inflated in 
the condition of large sample size but adjusted GFI (AGFI) was less influenced. 
CFI was more complicated than GFI and AGFI in that it also compared the 
observed covariances and modeled covariances to a null model where all 
covariances were zeros. CFI was least affected by sample size among various fit 
indices. SRMR referred to the average difference between the observed and 
modeled variances and covariances, based on standardized residuals. RMSEA 
was a commonly used index based on chi-square and the model’s degree of 
freedom. It represented discrepancy per degree of freedom. For CFI, GFI, and 
AGFI, a value larger than .90 indicated an adequate fit. For RMR and RMSEA, 
values lower than .08 and .06 indicated a good fit, respectively.  
The Polynomial Regression Procedure 
Different indices (e.g., algebraic difference, absolute difference, squared 
difference, and sum of absolute differences) had been suggested to study 
difference scores but their use was criticized for imposing untenable constraints 
(e.g., Edwards, 1994). An often used algebraic difference equation was: 
Z = b0 + b1(X – Y) + e,                                                                              (1)  
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where X and Y were predictors of Z, b0 represented the intercept, b1 represented 
the slope, while e represented the random measurement error. The equation 
could be expanded into: 
Z = b0 + b1X – b1Y + e.                                                                             (2)  
Here, researchers made an untenable assumption that the slopes for X and Y 
were equal in magnitude but opposite in sign. A more appropriate equation would 
be:  
 Z =  b0 + b1X + b2Y + e.                                                                            (3) 
Recognizing such a limitation, Edwards (1994) suggested using polynomial 
regression. The use of this procedure was based on following assumptions: (a) 
the relationship between two different scores and an outcome should be 
considered in three dimensions, (b) Three-dimensional response surfaces could 
be used to depict such a relationship, (c) The plausibility of the constraints could 
be tested using a hypothesis testing approach (Kristof, 1996). In this study, the 
polynomial regression procedure would be used to investigate the relationship 
between self-other agreement and performance. To account for possible 
curvilinear relationships, instead of using: 
Z =  b0 + b1(X – Y) + b2(X –Y)
2 + e,                                                           (4) 
or the expanded one: 
Z =  b0 + b1X – b1Y + b2X
2 - 2b2XY + b2Y
2 + e,                                         (5) 
a full quadratic equation would be adopted:  
Z =  b0 + b1X + b2Y + b3X
2 + b4XY + b5Y
2 + e.                                          (6) 
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The polynomial regression procedure would be conducted with three 
samples combined, instead of running it on each sample separately. This 
procedure had two advantages. First, a larger sample size would help to reduce 
standard errors. Second, differences between parameters in two samples could 
be identified effortlessly. Two dummy variables would be created to represent the 
three samples. These dummy variables were added to Equation 6 as moderators.  
Significant moderating effects would indicate significantly different regression 
parameters between two samples.    
A response surface not only provided vividness but also brought 
complexity. Fortunately, Edwards and Parry (1993) offered some convenient 
tools to facilitate interpretation. A three-dimensional figure usually took many 
different forms, such as plane, convex, concave, and saddle. For these figures, 
the key was to find out the slope and the curvature in some interesting areas. 
The first area was the stationary point, where the slope of the surface was zero in 
all directions. For some surface forms, such as plane, no stationary point existed. 
The second interesting area was the principal axes of the surface (the first 
principle axe and the second principle axe), which ran across the stationary point 
perpendicularly. These axes represented either the most or the least curvature, 
depending on the form of the surface. The third interesting area was along the X 
= Y line and the X = -Y line, both being related to self-other agreement. 
According to Edwards and Parry (1993), when X = Y, the full quadratic equation 
could be transformed into: 
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 Z =  b0 + (b1+ b2)X + (b3 + b4 + b5) X
2 + e,                                                (7)  
in which (b1+ b2) represented the slope at (0, 0), i.e., when both X and Y were 0, 
and the quantity (b3 + b4 + b5) represented the curvature along the line. When X= 
-Y was interested, the full quadratic equation could be transformed into  
Z =  b0 + (b1- b2)X + (b3 - b4 + b5) X
2 + e.                                                  (8)  
By identifying the stationary point, the principle axes, and the slope and the 
curvature along the X = Y (or X = -Y) line, the response surface could be clearly 
interpreted.   
Data Analysis Strategies 
To test hypotheses H1, H2, H5, and H6, the covariance matrices of three 
samples were created and EQS procedures were run to compare these 
covariance matrices by pairs. By specifying different model, i.e., loosing some 
constraints, covariances of different sizes could be identified. To test Hypotheses 
H3, H4, H7, and H8, a polynomial regression procedure was applied with sample 
source as controls. Supervisor-ratings of performance were regressed on self-
ratings and other-ratings in the first step (main effects), and the product of self-
ratings times other-ratings, the square of self-ratings and square of other-ratings 
in the second step (higher order effects). Self-, subordinate-, and peer-ratings, 
were also centered at the same value, based on the midpoint of their shared 
scale, in order to reduce multicollinearity (Kristof, 1996). 
 





Table 4 shows the means, standard deviations, and correlations 
coefficients among different ratings across three samples. The means in the 
global dispersed team (GDT) sample were close to those in the U.S. sample, but 
the means in the Chinese sample were consistently lower. With only competency 
ratings considered, the means of self-ratings were the closest to subordinate-
ratings, followed by those of peer- and supervisor-ratings, with peer-ratings 
averaging the lowest. Supervisors and peers in the Chinese sample tended to 
give lower ratings than did their GDT and U.S. counterparts. The standard 
deviation was the lowest for peer-ratings in the Chinese sample (SD = .366) and 
the highest for supervisor-ratings of performance in the U.S. sample (SD = .600). 
Supervisor-ratings had the largest standard deviations while variations in peers 
were the smallest. Self-ratings in the Chinese sample displayed more variation 
than those in the U.S. sample. In contrast, the standard deviations of supervisor-
ratings in the U.S. sample were larger than those in the Chinese sample. 
 The pattern of inter-correlations was similar in three samples: the 
correlations between self- and other-ratings were generally smaller than those 
between other-ratings. Self-ratings correlated the most strongly with subordinate- 
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ratings and the most weakly with performance. The correlation between self- and 
other-ratings was the highest in the Chinese sample and the lowest in the GDT 
sample. Among the correlations between other-ratings, the correlation between 
peer-ratings and supervisor-ratings of leadership was higher in the U.S. and the 
GDT samples, and the one in the Chinese sample was substantially lower. 
Instead, the correlation between subordinate- and peer-ratings was the highest in 
the Chinese sample. The correlations between supervisor-ratings of leadership 
and performance were consistently in mid .70s, indicating that these two 
measures shared a large amount of common variance. Supervisor-ratings of 
performance appeared to have lower correlations with other-ratings than did 
supervisor-ratings of leadership. 
Table 4  
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations by Sample 
                         Variables 
                          __________________________________________________ 
Persepective n M SD Self Sub Peer Sup 
_______________________________________________________________ 
All Participants        
    Self 2117 3.767 .421     
    Subordinate 1862 3.782 .450 .250**    
    Peer 1995 3.654 .377 .213** .382**   
    Supervisor 2117 3.692 .484 .201** .329** .424**  
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    Performance 2117 4.012 .581 .112** .279** .340** .764** 
The U.S.        
    Self 818 3.782 .405     
    Subordinate 715 3.830 .458 .285**    
    Peer 766 3.695 .377 .205** .349**   
    Supervisor 818 3.762 .509 .195** .351** .430**  
    Performance 818 4.094 .600 .125** .289** .333** .751** 
China        
    Self 428 3.700 .441     
    Subordinate 349 3.713 .448 .304**    
    Peer 395 3.535 .366 .296** .422**   
    Supervisor 428 3.529 .449 .232** .284** .303**  
    Performance 428 3.845 .536 .160** .270** .221** .751** 
GDTs        
    Self 871 3.784 .422     
    Subordinate 798 3.768 .440 .191**    
    Peer 834 3.672 .372 .159** .383**   
    Supervisor 871 3.707 .458 .169** .306** .434**  
    Performance 871 4.018 .566 .054 .252** .361** .768** 
_______________________________________________________________ 
Notes: ** p < 0.01 (2-tailed), * p < .05 (2-tailed). 
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EQS Results 
Three EQS statistical procedures were run to test the equality of 
covariance matrices for three pairs of samples (U.S. and China, U.S. and GDTs, 
China and GDTs), respectively. Table 5 lists different models and their fit indices. 
Model 1 represented the model with all covariances being constrained to equal 
and Model 2 represented the model with some untenable constraints being 
loosened. A constraint was untenable only when the multivariate Lagrange 
Multiplier (LM) test in EQS suggested removing a constraint would improve the 
model fit significantly. With some constraints being removed, the fit indices in 
Model 2 would show some improvements, featured with higher CPI, GPI, and 
AGPI, as well as lower Chi Square (λ2), SRMR, and RMSEA. 
U.S. versus China 
The model which specified that the U.S. sample and the Chinese sample 
shared the same covariance matrix was generally supported, with λ2(10) = 
10.860, p = n.s.. The indices of CPI, GPI, and AGPI were all larger than .95, 
indicating a good fit of the model. The indices of SRMR and RMSEA were 
smaller than .08 and .06, respectively, also indicating a good fit. However, the LM 
test revealed that loosening the constraint between peer-ratings and supervisor-
ratings of leadership would improve the fit of the model further. The fit indices of 
the new model suggested a better fit, with λ2(9) = 7.998, p = .n.s.. The CPI index 
reached 1.000, indicating a perfect fit. The indices of GFI and AGFI increased 
slightly, while the values of SRMR and RMSEA became even lower, showing 
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some improvements over the original model. Hypothesis 1 stated that self-ratings 
would correlate higher with other-ratings in the Chinese sample than in the U.S. 
sample. Because the U.S. sample and the Chinese sample had very similar 
covariance matrices, Hypothesis 1 was not supported. Hypothesis 2 claimed that 
consensus between other-ratings would be lower for Chinese. Peer-ratings were 
found to correlate lower with supervisor-ratings of leadership in the Chinese 
sample than in the U.S. sample. Therefore, Hypothesis 2 was partially supported.  
Table 5  
Fit Indices for the Equality of Covariance Tests 
 Indices 
 ________________________________________________ 
 λ2 CFI GFI AGFI SRMR RMSEA 
_________________________________________________________________ 
China vs. U.S.       
   Model1 (df = 10) 10.86 .999 .996 .987 .028 .009 
   Model2 (df = 9) 7.998 1.000 .997 .989 .023 .000 
U.S. vs. GDTs       
   Model1 (df = 10) 9.762 1.000 .997 .992 .024 .000 
China vs. GDTs       
   Model1 (df = 10) 17.924 .995 .993 .980 .048 .027 
   Model 2(df = 6) 7.824 .999 .997 .986 .030 .017 
_________________________________________________________________ 
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U.S. versus GDTs 
A similar procedure was conducted between the GDT and the U.S. 
samples. The results demonstrated that the covariance matrix of the GDT 
sample was equivalent to that of the U.S. sample, with λ2(10) =  9.762, p = n.s.. 
The values of CPI, GFI, and AGFI were all larger than .95, while SRMR and 
RMSEA remained quite small. Specifically, the index of CPI equaled to 1.000, 
indicating a perfect fit of the model. The indices of GPI and AGPI were above .99, 
indicating a nearly perfect fit of the model. The value of SRMR was .024, which 
was substantially lower than .08, while the value of RMSEA approached zero, 
also indicating a perfect fit of the model. Hypothesis 5 claimed that self-other 
agreement would be lower in the GDT sample than the U.S. sample. The EQS 
results failed to support the hypothesis. However, Hypothesis 6 was supported, 
as the correlations between other-ratings in the GDT sample remained close to 
those in the U.S. sample.  
China versus GDTs 
Since the self-other correlations were the highest in the Chinese sample 
and the lowest in the GDT sample, it would be interesting to see whether these 
two covariance matrices equaled to each other, so an additional EQS statistical 
procedure was conducted. The model with all covariances being constrained 
equal was only marginally supported, with λ2(10) = 17.924, p = .056. After 
loosening the constraints between self-ratings and subordinate-ratings, between 
self-ratings and peer-ratings, between self-ratings and supervisor-ratings of 
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performance, and between peer-ratings and supervisor-ratings of leadership, the 
fit of the model improved greatly, with λ2(6) = 7.824, p = n.s.. CPI increased 
from .995 to .999, GPI increased from .993 to .997, and AGPI increased 
from .980 to .986. In contrast, the value of SRMR decreased from .048 to .030 
and that of RMSEA reduced to .017 from .027, showing some substantial 
improvements over the original model. These results suggested that self-other 
agreement was easier to achieve in the Chinese sample than in the GDT sample. 
Also, consensus between peer-ratings and supervisor-ratings of leadership was 
higher in the GDT sample than in the Chinese sample, consistent with what was 
found in the previous comparison between the Chinese and the U.S. samples.  
Demographics and Self-Other Agreement 
Before moving on to investigate possible relationships between self-other 
agreement and performance, a multivariate regression procedure was used to 
explore the effects of demographic factors on self-other agreement. Because the 
results of demographic analyses demonstrated some interesting patterns that 
could facilitate the interpretion of the results from other analyses, they were 
thoroughly presented in this section. As a multivariate analysis procedure similar 
to MANOVA, Wilks’ Lambda has been routinely reported (Tabachnick & Fidell’s, 
2001). The magnitude of Wilks’ Lambda represents the proportion of variance of 
self- and other- ratings that is not accounted for by the demographic variables.  
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Table 6  
Demographics and Self-Other Agreement with the U.S. Sample 
 Self Other 
 _______________________ _______________________ 
 B SE t p B SE t p 
_____________________________________________________________ 
Self vs. Subordinate        
    Gender -.024 .031 .759 .448 .054 .036 1.493 .136 
    Race .048 .045 1.064 .288 .003 .052 .056 .955 
    Age .004† .002 1.946 .052 -.002 .002 .732 .465 
    Education .015 .033 .471 .638 .021 .038 .546 .585 
    R2 .008 .004 
    Wilks’ Λ .985 
Self vs. Peer         
    Gender -.009 .031 .293 .770 .042 .029 1.462 .144 
    Race .052 .043 1.223 .222 -.034 .040 .839 .402 
    Age .006** .002 2.954 .003 .003† .002 1.771 .077 
    Education .011 .031 .342 .733 .027 .030 .914 .361 
    R2 .013* .008 
    Wilks’ Λ .980* 
______________________________________________________________ 
Notes: ** p < 0.01 (2-tailed), *  p < .05 (2-tailed), † p < .10 (2-tailed). 
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Demographic Effects in the U.S. Sample 
Table 6 demonstrated demographics were not related to self- and 
subordinates-ratings, but were related to self- and peer-ratings jointly in the U.S. 
sample (Wilks’ Λ = .980, F(2, 763) = 1.947, p = .050). A follow-up univariate 
analysis indicated that only self-ratings were affected (R2 = .013, F(4, 761) = 
2.551, p = .038). Particularly, older ratees tended to slightly overestimate 
themselves compared with subordinates. The overestimation effect weakened 
when their ratings were compared to peer-ratings, because peers also gave 
higher ratings to older ratees. Gender, race, and education were not related to 
individual ratings as well as self-other agreement in the U.S. sample. 
As shown in Table 7, demographics also affected self-ratings and 
supervisor-ratings of leadership (Wilks’ Λ = .974, F(2, 815) = 2.708, p = .006), 
and self-ratings and supervisor-ratings of performance (Wilks’ Λ = .979, F(2, 815) 
= 2.203, p = .025). The four demographic variables accounted for a significant 
portion of variance in self-ratings (R2 = .012, F(4, 813) = 2.376, p = .051), with 
older ratees giving themselves higher ratings than their younger counterparts, 
resulting an overestimation effect. These demographic factors were also related 
to supervisor-ratings of leadership (R2 = .016, F(4, 813) = 3.263, p = .011), but 
not related to supervisor-ratings of performance (R2 = .009, F(4, 813) = 1.920, p 
= n.s.). Ratees with more education received higher ratings from their 
supervisors than did their counterparts who had less education. Because self-
ratings were not related to education level, ratees with higher education  
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Table 7  
Demographics and Self-Supervisor Agreement with the U.S. Sample 
 Self Other 
 _______________________ _______________________ 
 B SE t p B SE t p 
_____________________________________________________________ 
Self vs. Supervisor        
    Gender -.018 .030 .517 .537 .069† .038 1.846 .065 
    Race .051 .042 1.220 .223 .022 .052 .420 .674 
    Age .005** .002 2.805 .005 .003 .002 1.425 .155 
    Education .009 .031 .296 .767 .109** .039 2.831 .005 
    R2 .012† .016* 
    Wilks’ Λ .974** 
Self vs. Performance        
    Gender -.018 .030 .517 .537 .083† .044 1.871 .062 
    Race .051 .042 1.220 .223 .014 .062 .220 .826 
    Age .005** .002 2.805 .005 -.001 .003 .190 .850 
    Education .009 .031 .296 .767 .096* .046 2.099 .036 
    R2 .012† .009 
    Wilks’ Λ .979* 
______________________________________________________________ 
Notes: ** p < 0.01 (2-tailed), * p < .05 (2-tailed), † p < .10 (2-tailed). 
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appeared to be more accurate estimators than those with lower education. In 
other words, ratees with lower education tended to be over-estimators. Overall, 
the variance accounted for by demographic variables was small and would not 
affect MSF ratings substantially. 
Demographic Effects in the Chinese Sample 
Table 8 indicates that gender and education were significantly related to 
self- and subordinate-ratings jointly in the Chinese sample (Wilks’ Λ = .949, F(2, 
346) = 3.013, p = .006). Further univariate analyses revealed that the effects 
were resulted from self-ratings (R2 = .049, F(3, 345) = 5.870, p = .006), not from 
subordinate-ratings (R2 = .006, F(3, 345) = .682, p = n.s.). Male ratees rated 
themselves higher than their female counterparts while subordinate-ratings were 
not related to the ratee’s gender, making males over-estimators. Ratees who had 
more education rated themselves higher than those who had less while 
subordinate-ratings were not related to the ratee’s education level, making ratees 
with more education over-estimators. Self- and peer-ratings together were 
strongly influenced by demographic factors in the Chinese sample (Wilks’ Λ 
= .933, F(2, 392) = 4.559, p < .001), due to self-ratings (R2 = .059, F(3, 391) = 
8.219, p < .001), and peer-ratings to a lesser extent (R2 = .017, F(3, 391) = 2.253, 
p = .082). Similar to the self-subordinate comparison, males and ratees with 
more education tended to be over-estimators compared with peers. Older ratees 
gave themselves higher ratings than their younger counterparts, but they also 
received higher ratings from their peers. The overestimation effect was mitigated.  
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Table 8  
Demographics and Self-Other Agreement with the Chinese Sample 
 Self Other 
 _______________________ _______________________ 
 B SE t p B SE t p 
_______________________________________________________________ 
Self vs. Subordinate (n = 349)       
    Gender -.139** .048 2.894 .004 -.012 .052 .239 .811 
    Age .005 .004 1.453 .147 .004 .004 1.021 .308 
    Education .094* .047 1.986 .048 .043 .051 .841 .401 
    R2 .049** .006 
    Wilks’ Λ .949** 
Self vs. Peer (n = 395)        
    Gender -.105* .047 2.210 .028 .017 .039 .434 .665 
    Age .012** .004 3.203 .001 .007* .003 2.127 .034 
    Education .093* .047 1.986 .048 .054 .039 1.382 .168 
    R2 .059** .017† 
    Wilks’ Λ .933** 
_______________________________________________________________ 
Notes: ** p < 0.01 (2-tailed), * p < .05 (2-tailed), † p < .10 (2-tailed). 
The finding that ratees with more education were over-estimators compared with 
both subordinates and peers was inconsistent with what had been found in the  
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Table 9  
Demographics and Self-Supervisor Agreement with the Chinese Sample 
 Self Other 
 ________________________ _______________________ 
 B SE t p B SE t p 
______________________________________________________________ 
Self vs. Supervisor        
    Gender -.099* .045 2.189 .029 .104* .047 2.239 .026 
    Age .012** .004 3.265 .001 .005 .004 1.310 .191 
    Education .090* .044 2.032 .043 .107* .046 2.326 .021 
    R2 .056** .025* 
    Wilks’ Λ .921** 
Self vs. Performance        
    Gender -.099* .045 2.189 .029 .138* .055 2.498 .013 
    Age .012** .004 3.265 .001 .001 .004 .237 .813 
    Education .090* .044 2.032 .043 .166** .055 3.049 .002 
    R2 .056** .033** 
    Wilks’ Λ .911** 
______________________________________________________________ 
Notes: ** p < 0.01 (2-tailed), * p < .05 (2-tailed). 
U.S. sample, where ratees with less education were over-estimators.   
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In the Chinese sample, demographic factors had a strong influence on 
self-ratings and supervisor-ratings of leadership (Wilks’ Λ = .921, F(2, 425) = 
5.949, p < .001),  and self-ratings and supervisor-ratings of performance (Wilks’  
Λ = .911, F(2, 425) = 6.738, p < .001). Table 9 indicates that both self- and 
supervisor-ratings were significantly related to the demographics. The three  
demographic variables accounted for 5.6% of the variance in self-ratings (F(3, 
424) = 8.324, p < .001), 2.5% in supervisor-ratings of leadership (F(3, 424) = 
3.559, p = .014), and 3.3% in supervisor-ratings of performance (F(3, 424) = 
4.860, p = .002). Males gave themselves higher ratings than females but their 
supervisors rated females higher than males. As a result, males became severe 
over-estimators while females appeared to be accurate estimators. Older ratees 
also rated themselves higher than their younger counterparts, but supervisor-
ratings were not related to age. Therefore, older ratees appeared to be over-
estimators compared with supervisors. Ratees with more education gave 
themselves higher ratings than their counterparts and received higher ratings 
from their supervisors as well. The overestimation effect was not present. 
Demographic Effects in the GDT Sample 
Table 10 illustrates that demographic factors were significantly related to 
self- and subordinate-ratings jointly in the GDT sample, (Wilks’ Λ = .982, F(2, 795) 
= 2.378, p = .027). The demographic effects were related to both self-ratings (R2 
= .010, F(3, 794) = 2.759, p = .041) and subordinate-ratings (R2 = .011, F(3, 794) 
= 2.822, p = .038). While older ratees gave themselves higher ratings, they also  
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 Table 10  
Demographics and Self-Other Agreement with the GDT Sample 
 Self Other 
 _______________________ _______________________ 
 B SE t p B SE t p 
______________________________________________________________ 
Self vs. Subordinate        
    Gender .015 .035 .419 .675 .047 .037 1.288 .198 
    Age .006** .002 2.871 .004 .006** .002 2.709 .007 
    Education -.002 .030 .077 .939 .011 .032 .347 .738 
    R2 .010** .011* 
    Wilks’ Λ .982* 
Self vs. Peer        
    Gender .019 .035 .537 .582 .063* .031 2.062 .040 
    Age .007** .002 3.542 < .001 .003 .002 1.588 .113 
    Education .006 .030 .198 .843 -.005 .026 .186 .852 
    R2 .015* .008† 
    Wilks’ Λ .979* 
________________________________________________________________ 
Notes: ** p < 0.01 (2-tailed), * p < .05 (2-tailed), † p < .10 (2-tailed). 
received higher ratings of the same magnitude from their subordinates. Thus, no 
overestimation effect was observed. Demographics were also related to self- and 
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peer-ratings jointly in the GDT sample (Wilks’ Λ = .979, F(2, 831) = 2.906, p 
= .008), due to both self-ratings (R2 = .015, F(3, 830) = 4.210, p = .006) and  
peer-ratings (R2 = .008, F(3, 830) = 2.094, p = .099). Females gave themselves 
ratings close to those of males, but their peers rated them higher than males. As 
a result, females would be more accurate estimators than males, who instead 
appeared to be over-estimators. Older ratees gave themselves higher ratings  
than did their younger counterparts, while peer-ratings remained impartial. Thus, 
older ratees appeared to be over-estimators. Peers rated female ratees higher 
than males but self-ratings were not related to gender. Males seemed to be over-
estimators compared with females. Neither self-ratings nor peer-ratings were 
related to education in the GDT sample. 
Demographics affected self- and supervisor-ratings of leadership only 
marginally (Wilks’ Λ = .986, F(2, 868) = 2.090, p = .052), but they affected self-
ratings and supervisor-ratings of performance significantly (Wilks’ Λ = .979, F(2, 
868) = 3.023, p = .006). Table 11 indicates that self-ratings were significantly 
related to the demographics (R2 = .012, F(3, 867) = 3.586, p = .013) while the 
relationship between demographic variables and supervisor-ratings of 
performance was only marginal (R2 = .008, F(3, 867) = 2.194, p = .087). Older 
ratees tended to over-estimate themselves and the degree of overestimation 
became more pronounced as their supervisors gave them lower performance 
ratings than those younger ratees. Gender and education level were not related 
to both self- and supervisor-ratings. 
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Table 11  
Demographics and Self-Supervisor Agreement with the GDT Sample 
 Self Other 
 _______________________ _______________________ 
 B SE t p B SE t p 
______________________________________________________________ 
Self vs. Supervisor        
    Gender .018 .034 .543 .587 .042 .037 1.132 .258 
    Age .006** .002 3.266 .001 .001 .002 .246 .805 
    Education .006 .029 .215 .830 .025 .032 .808 .419 
    R2 .012** .002 
    Wilks’ Λ .986 
Self vs. Performance        
    Gender .018 .034 .543 .587 .053 .046 1.160 .247 
    Age .006** .002 3.266 .001 -.005* .003 2.039 .042 
    Education .006 .029 .215 .830 -.026 .039 .676 .499 
    R2 .012** .008† 
    Wilks’ Λ .979* 
______________________________________________________________ 
Notes: ** p < 0.01 (2-tailed), * p < .05 (2-tailed), † p < .10 (2-tailed). 
Overall, the demographic effects were present in all three samples. Their 
effects were the most pronounced in the Chinese sample, with all three variables 
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being related to self- and other-ratings. The GDT sample was the least affected 
by demographic factors, as gender and education were only related to self- and 
other-ratings in few cases. Among the three demographic variables (gender, age, 
and educational level), age had the most consistent effects on self-ratings, 
represented by an overestimation effect in older ratees. Education level affected 
supervisor-ratings in the U.S. and the Chinese samples but not in the GDT 
sample. Gender affected both self- and supervisor-ratings in the Chinese sample. 
Therefore, demographic variables seemed to affect ratings disparately in different 
cultural settings and across different perspectives. As a result, demographic 
variables were included in following polynomial analyses. 
Polynomial Regression 
 Polynomial regression analyses were conducted in three phases. First, 
two separate polynomial regressions were run for self-subordinate and self-peer 
ratings, with all participants included. Second, two similar polynomial regressions 
were run, but with sample source as moderator. Significant cross-product terms 
that included the dummy variables would suggest the presence of moderating 
effects. Third, polynomial regressions were conducted independently for 
separate samples. 
Omnibus Relationships 
With all participants included, separate polynomial regressions were run 
for self-subordinate and self-peer ratings, respectively (see Table 12). For self-  
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 Table 12  
Polynomial Regressions with All Participants 
 Self-Subordinate (n = 1,862) Self-Peer(n = 1,995) 
 _______________________ ________________________ 
 B SE B SE B SE B SE 
________________________________________________________________ 
Constant 4.032 .018 3.970 .025 4.040 .017 3.954 .024 
Self .048 .032 .057† .032 .052† .030 .062* .030 
Sub .344** .030 .334** .031 .502** .033 .491** .033 
Self squared -.032 .056 -.017 .056 -.016 .051 -.002 .050 
Self * Other .070 .072 .065 .072 .038 .083 .030 .083 
Other squared -.037 .049 -.040 .049 -.129* .063 -.115† .063 
Gender   .073** .019  
 
.090** .018 





.032 .027  
 
.055* .025 
R2 .080** .088** .119** .133** 
_______________________________________________________________ 
Notes: ** p < 0.01 (2-tailed), * p < .05 (2-tailed), † p < .10 (2-tailed). 
subordinate agreement, the polynomial regression equation was significant, with 
R2 = .080, F(5, 1856) = 32.148, p < .001. The polynomial regression equation for 
self-peer agreement was also significant, with R2 = .119, F(5, 1989) = 53.579, p 
< .001. Demographic variables accounted for some additional variance but had 
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little impact on the size of parameters in the regression equations. For self-
subordinate agreement, self-ratings predicted performance marginally well, with 
B = .057, t(1853) = 1.753, p = .080. In contrast, subordinate-ratings displayed a 
strong relationship with performance, with B = .334, t(1853) = 10.935, p < .001. 
However, the quadratic terms were not significant. The response surface 
displayed in Figure 4a was generally flat. Along the line of perfect agreement (X 
= Y), performance increased linearly as self- and other-ratings went from the low 
end to the high end, with a1 = .391, F(1, 1856) = 102.355, p < .001, and a2 = .008, 
F(1, 1856) = .000, p = n.s.. The line of complete disagreement (X = -Y) had a 
negative slope, with a3 = -.277, F(1, 1856) =35.540, p < .001, and appeared 
slightly convex, with a4 = -.122, F(1, 1856) = 1.302, p = n.s., suggesting that 
over-estimators tended to have lower performance than under-estimators.  
For self-peer agreement, performance was related to both self-ratings (B 
= .062, t(1986) = 2.984, p = .037) and peer-ratings (B = .491, t(1986) = 14.819, p 
< .001). The quadratic term of peer ratings was also related to performance, but 
only marginally (B = -.115, t(1986) = 1.827, p = .068). Other quadratic terms were 
not significant. The response surface in Figure 4b showed a slightly convex 
shape. Along the line of perfect agreement, in agreement at higher levels was 
related to higher performance than in agreement at lower ratings of behavior, 
with a1 = .553, F(1, 1989) = 197.837, p < .001. The relationship appeared linear, 
with a2 = -.087, F(1, 1989) = 1.282, p = n.s.. Over-estimators had a poorer 
performance than under-estimators, as demonstrated by the negative slope of  
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the line of complete disagreement, with a3 = -.429, F(1, 1989) = 197.837, p 
< .001. The line appeared slightly convex, with a4 =  -.147, F(1, 1989) = 1.801, p 
= n.s..  
Moderated Polynomial Regressions 
To investigate whether the pattern of relationships between self-other 
agreement and performance was different across samples, moderated 
polynomial regressions were conducted, with sample source as moderator. 
Because very few terms in the regression equations turned out significant, tables 
are not presented here. The results of the first moderated polynomial regression 
showed that the pattern of relationship between self-subordinate agreement and 
performance was similar in all three samples, since adding the interaction terms 
with sample source contributed only .004 to R2 with F(10, 1844) = .804, p = n.s.. 
The results of the second moderated polynomial regression showed some 
significant differences in the pattern of relationships between self-peer 
agreement and performance, with R2 = .008, F(10, 1977) = 1.835, p = .050. The 
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slope for peer-ratings in the Chinese sample was .224 points lower than that in 
the U.S. sample (t(1977) = 2.234, p = .026), indicating that peer-ratings in the 
Chinese sample were not as a strong predictor for performance as those in the 
U.S. sample. Since a significant moderating effect was present in the second 
moderated polynomial regression, it is worthwhile to conduct independent 
polynomial regressions on separate samples. 
Polynomial Regression Analysis by Sample 
Two polynomial regressions were conducted for each sample. The race 
variable was not included because it was not related to self-other agreement in 
the U.S. sample and was not included in the Chinese and the GDT samples 
either. Removing the variable from polynomial regressions was a reasonable act. 
To facilitate comparisons between samples, separate response surfaces were 
drawn (see Figure 4).  
Polynomial regression results for the U.S. sample. For the U.S. sample, 
both polynomial regression equations were significant (see Table 13). Self- and 
subordinate-ratings accounted for 8.8% of the variance in performance (F(5, 709) 
= 13.628, p < .001), while self- and peer-ratings accounted for 12.1% of it (F(5, 
760) = 20.827, p < .001). Subordinate-ratings were significantly related to 
performance (B = .362, t(706) = 7.008, p < .001), but neither the term of self-
ratings nor the quadratic terms were significant. Nevertheless, the response 
surface (see Figure 4c) indicated that self-ratings were positively related to 
performance when subordinate-ratings were high. Performance increased  
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Table 13  
Polynomial Regressions with the U.S. Sample 
 Self-Subordinate (n = 715) Self-Peer(n = 766) 
 _______________________ _________________________ 
 B SE B SE B SE B SE 
________________________________________________________________ 
Constant 4.121 .031 4.040 .072 4.150 .029 4.026 .067 
Self .041 .057 .042 .057 .081 .052 .086† .052 
Sub .365** .052 .362** .052 .488** .056 .482** .056 
Self squared -.157 .102 -.144 .102 -.057 .092 -.053 .092 
Self * Other .067 .133 .075 .133 -.012 .151 .012 .150 
Other squared -.022 .081 -.024 .081 -.243* .101 -.235* .101 
Gender   .044 .046  
 
.071† .043 





.067 .048  
 
.086* .044 
R squared .088** .091** .121** .129** 
_________________________________________________________________ 
Notes: ** p < 0.01 (2-tailed), * p < .05 (2-tailed), † p < .10 (2-tailed). 
linearly along the line of perfect agreement as self-subordinate ratings increased, 
with a1 = .404, F(1, 709) = 38.244, p < .001, and a2 = -.093, F(1, 709) = .678, p = 
n.s.. Performance of under-estimators was higher than that of over-estimators 
along the line of complete disagreement, with a3 = -.320, F(1, 709) = 14.145, p 
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< .001. The line appeared slightly convex, with a4 = -.243, F(1, 709) = 1.143, p = 
n.s.. The slightly convex line suggested that performance dropped at an 
increasing rate when the degree of overestimation increased, while extreme 
under-estimators seemed to have poor performance. Peer-ratings were also 
significantly related to performance (B = .482, t(757) = 8.584, p < .001), but self-
ratings were only marginally related (B = .086, t(757) = 1.668, p = .096). The 
quadratic term for peer-ratings were also significant (B = -.235, t(757) = 2.348, p 
= .019), suggesting a convex-shaped response surface. Examination of surface 
features (see Figure 4d) suggested that performance decreased as self-ratings 
and peer-ratings went from high to low and decreased more rapidly when the 
ratings become lower along the line of perfect agreement, with a1 = .553, F(1, 
760) = 70.830, p < .001 and a2 = -.276, F(1, 760) = 3.452, p = .064. Along the 
line of complete disagreement, under-estimators achieved higher performance 
than over-estimators and performance became successively lower as lack of 
agreement increased, with a3 = -.396, F(1, 760) = 23.285, p < .001 and a4 = -.300, 
F(1, 760) = 1.440, p = n.s.. The pattern of relationships is similar to that found in 
Atwater et al. (2005) with the U.S. sample.  
Polynomial regression results for the Chinese sample. For the Chinese 
sample, both polynomial regression equations were significant (see Table 14). 
Self- and subordinate-ratings accounted for 8.5% of the variance in performance 
(F(5, 343) = 6.342, p < .001), but self- and peer-ratings accounted for only 6.3% 
of the variance (F(5, 389) = 5.241, p < .001), which was substantially lower than  
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Table 14  
Polynomial Regressions with the Chinese Sample 
 Self-Subordinate (n = 349) Self-Peer(n = 395) 
 _______________________ _______________________ 
 B SE B SE B SE B SE 
_______________________________________________________________ 
Constant 3.840 .040 3.742 .049 3.834 .038 3.724 .047 
Self .109 .069 .125† .070 .128* .063 .146* .063 
Sub .291** .065 .285** .065 .268** .077 .254** .076 
Self squared .055 .122 .063 .121 .039 .106 .031 .104 
Self * Other .118 .160 .096 .159 .160 .189 .136 .186 
Other squared .057 .108 .068 .107 .021 .149 .065 .147 
Gender   .152** .060   .172** .057 
Age   .000 .005   -.002 .005 
Education 
  
.132** .058  
 
.144** .056 
R2 .085** .115** .063** .099** 
_______________________________________________________________ 
Notes: ** p < 0.01 (2-tailed), * p < .05 (2-tailed), † p < .10 (2-tailed). 
that in the U.S. sample. Subordinate-ratings were significantly related to 
performance (B = .285, t(340) = 4.418, p < .001), while self-ratings were 
marginally related (B = .125, t(340) = 1.797, p = .073). Other terms were not 
significant. The response surface (see Figure 4e) appeared rather flat. 
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Examination of surface features suggested that a1 was .410 (F(1, 343) = 25.287, 
p < .001) and a2 was .227 (F(1, 343) = 1.754, p = n.s.), representing a positively 
sloped but slightly concave line along the line of perfect agreement. Thus, 
performance decreased as self-subordinate ratings moved downwards from the 
high end but leveled off at the low end. Along the line of complete disagreement, 
under-estimators achieved higher performance than accurate estimators and 
over-estimators, with a3 = -.160, F(1, 343) = 2.852, p = .092) and a4 = .037, F(1, 
343) = .001, p = n.s..  
Performance was significantly related to both self-ratings (B = .146, t(386) 
= 2.298, p = .022) and peer-ratings (B = .254, t(384) = 3.330, p = .001), but other 
terms were not significant. Examination of surface features (also see Figure 4f) 
suggested that a1 was .400 (F(1, 389) = 22.019, p < .001) and a2 was .232 (F(1, 
389) = 1.368, p = n.s.). Therefore, the line of perfect agreement was positively 
sloped and slightly concave. Similar to self-subordinate agreement, Figure 4f 
illustrated that the line of perfect agreement also leveled off at the lower end. The 
line of complete disagreement had a modest slope and was virtually linear, with 
a3 = -.106, F(1, 389) =1.549, p = n.s., and a4 = -.040, F(1, 389) = .092, p = n.s., 
suggesting that performance of under-estimators were not different from that of 
over-estimators.  
The response surfaces corresponding to these two polynomial regressions 
in the Chinese sample were quite similar to each other, with the line of perfect 
agreement peaking at the higher end and leveling off at the lower end. Because 
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the line of complete disagreement had a modest slope and was linear, 
overestimation only corresponds to slightly poorer performance, leading to the 
rejection of Hypothesis 3. Since under-estimators in the Chinese sample tended 
to have higher performance than those in the U.S. sample, Hypothesis 4 was 
supported.  
Polynomial regression results for the GDT sample. Polynomial regression 
results for the GDT sample are present in Table 15. Self- and subordinate-ratings 
accounted for 6.8% of the variance in performance (F(5, 792) = 11.484, p < .001), 
while self- and peer-ratings accounted for 13.5% of the variance (F(5, 828) = 
25.874, p < .001). Subordinate-ratings were significantly related to performance 
(B = .315, t(789) = 6.786, p < .001), but self-ratings were not. The quadratic term 
of subordinate ratings was marginally related to performance (B = -.131, t(789) = 
1.722, p = .086), suggesting a convex shape (see Figure 4g). Since self-ratings 
were not related to performance, self-other agreement would be less relevant. 
The parameters related to the response surfaces were not reported. Figure 4g 
indicates that accurate estimators with high self-ratings tended to be high 
performers and those who overestimated themselves the most had the lowest 
performance.  
Peer-ratings were significantly related to performance (B = .545, t(825) = 
10.980, p < .001), but self-ratings were not. The quadratic term of peer-ratings 
was marginally related to performance (B = -.181, t(825) = 1.838, p = .066), 
suggesting a convex shape (see Figure 4h). The parameters related to response  
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Table 15  
Polynomial Regressions with the GDT Sample 
 Self-Subordinate (n = 798) Self-Peer(n = 834) 
 ______________________ _______________________ 
 B SE B SE B SE B SE 
________________________________________________________________ 
Constant 4.038 .027 4.057 .035 4.038 .026 4.039 .033 
Self .011 .048 .021 .048 -.007 .044 .006 .044 
Sub .307** .046 .315** .046 .543** .050 .545** .050 
Self squared .050 .080 .043 .080 .040 .073 .034 .074 
Self * Other .074 .103 .059 .103 .043 .119 .026 .119 
Other squared -.127† .076 -.131† .076 -.197* .098 -.181† .098 
Gender   .033 .046   .020 .043 
Age   -.007** .003   -.006** .002 
Education 
  
-.056 .039  
 
-.017 .037 
R2 .068** .079** .135** .143** 
_______________________________________________________________ 
Notes: ** p < 0.01 (2-tailed), * p < .05 (2-tailed), † p < .10 (2-tailed). 
surfaces were not reported, due to the same aforementioned reason.  Figure 4h 
indicated that performance was solely determined by peer-ratings and the 
relationship between peer-ratings and performance was strong.  
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Figures 4g and 4h shared many commonalities. Both subordinate- and 
peer-ratings were related to performance and took a convex shape. However, 
because self-ratings were not related to performance, there was little evidence 
showing underestimation and overestimation would result in poorer performance 
in the GDT sample than in the U.S. sample. Therefore, both Hypotheses 7 and 8 
were not supported.  
Summary 
 The pattern of means and standard deviations was similar across the 
three samples. However, the magnitude of the means in the Chinese sample was 
consistently lower than that in the other two samples. The correlations between 
other-ratings were stable across samples but those between self- and other-
ratings were less stable. The self-other correlations were the highest in the 
Chinese sample but were the lowest in the GDT sample. While the SEQ results 
did identify some correlations of different sizes between self- and other-ratings 
between the Chinese and the GDT samples, no differences were present 
between the U.S. and the Chinese samples, and between the U.S. and the GDT 
samples, leading to the rejection of Hypotheses 1 and 5. The correlations 
between other-ratings in the Chinese sample were not different from those in the 
U.S. sample, except that self-ratings correlated significantly lower with 
supervisor-ratings of leadership in the Chinese sample, lending partial support to 
Hypothesis 2. Since the correlations between other-ratings in the GDT sample 
were not different from those in the U.S. sample, Hypothesis 6 was not supported.  
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Multivariate regression analyses revealed demographic variables were 
related to self-other agreement. Among all four perspectives, self-ratings were 
the most susceptible to demographic influences. Among all demographic 
variables, age demonstrated the most consistent effects on self-ratings across all 
three samples. Among the samples, the Chinese sample was affected by 
demographics the most while the GDT sample the least. Thus, demographic 
effects on self-other agreement varied across perspectives and samples. As 
demographic effects were present, demographic variables were included in 
subsequent polynomial regression equations.  
The polynomial regression results indicated disparate relationships 
between self-other agreement and performance across the three samples. The 
results for the U.S. sample generally replicated those found in other previous 
studies with different U.S. samples. The response surfaces in the Chinese 
sample were flatter than those in the U.S. sample and the overestimation effects 
appeared only in some extreme situations, so Hypothesis 3 was not supported. 
In contrast, under-estimators in the Chinese culture tended to have slightly higher 
performance than accurate estimators, lending support to Hypothesis 4. For the 
GDT sample, neither overestimation nor underestimation was related to 
performance, so Hypotheses 7 and 8 were not supported.    
 




Means and Standard Deviations 
The descriptive statistics indicated that the pattern of means of different 
perspectives was similar across all three samples, with supervisor-ratings of 
performance being the highest, followed by self- and subordinate-ratings, and 
peer-ratings being one of the lowest. Supervisors could differentiate ratees the 
best, indicated by the largest standard deviations they had. Peers had the 
smallest standard deviations, making them less discriminating raters. The 
observation that peers had the lowest means and standard deviations is 
consistent with what has been found in the Atwater et al. (2005) and Ostroff et al. 
(2004) studies, which also used the Profilor measure.  
Ratings in the Chinese sample averaged consistently lower than those in 
the other two samples, particularly for peer- and supervisor-ratings. While it may 
imply a modesty tendency in Chinese, it may also reflect some true 
discrepancies in leadership competencies between Chinese and American 
managers. Chinese mangers are generally younger, more poorly trained, and 
less familiar with empowering, facilitating, and team-based leadership which has 
been practiced widely in the West. Management in China is still underdeveloped 
and team-related research and practice have lagged far behind the U.S.  
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In the Chinese sample, the mean of self-ratings was similar to that of 
subordinate-ratings, but substantially higher than those of peer- and supervisor-
ratings. Therefore, a leniency bias suggested by Fahr, Dobbins and Cheung 
(1991), which states Chinese employees tend to rate themselves less favorably 
than do their supervisors, is not present in this study. The pattern observed is 
consistent with that in Furnham and Stringfield (1994) and Goodstein, Stringfield 
and Zevulun (1990). Significant changes have taken place in China during the 
past 15 years, which may contribute to the shift in rating style. In addition, ratees 
working in multinational companies may have changed their behavior to 
accommodate westernized organizational structure and culture. 
The standard deviation of self-ratings in the Chinese sample was larger 
than that in the U.S. sample but close to those of subordinate-ratings and 
supervisor-ratings of leadership. Chinese ratees are comfortable to give 
themselves both high and low ratings. As MSF is mainly used for developmental 
purposes, rating oneself low may reflect a drive to learn. People from a 
collectivist culture may pay more attention to self-improvement in order to meet 
role obligations (Heine et al., 2001). The standard deviations of supervisor-
ratings in the Chinese sample were found to be smaller than those in the U.S. 
sample, which lends some support to Atwater et al.’s (2005) speculation that 
people from the collectivist culture may give less discriminating ratings to others.  
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Correlations between Ratings 
A general pattern of correlations emerges across samples. First, 
correlations between other-ratings are generally larger than those between self- 
and other-ratings. Second, correlations between other-ratings seem very stable 
across samples, within a narrow range of high .20s and low .40s. Third, 
correlations between self- and other-ratings vary considerably across samples. 
The self-other correlations in the Chinese sample were consistently higher than 
those in the U.S. sample, which in turn were higher than those in the GDT 
sample. It seems that culture’s influence on consensus between other-ratings is 
trivial in comparison to self-other agreement.   
Although the correlations between self- and other-ratings were 
consistently higher in the Chinese sample than those in the U.S. sample, the 
follow-up EQS analysis suggested the differences were not significant. Therefore, 
Hypothesis 1 is not supported. However, the differences between the Chinese 
and the GDT samples were found significant, which implies that the differences 
between the Chinese and the U.S. samples could be something more than errors. 
A possible reason for not finding the differences significant may lie in the 
population the Chinese sample represented. Most participants in the Chinese 
sample worked for multinational companies. If participants from local Chinese 
companies are enlisted, the differences may actually turn out significant.     
Hypothesis 2 speculated that the correlations between other-ratings would 
be lower in the Chinese sample than that in the U.S. sample. The hypothesis is 
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only partially supported, with the correlations between peer-ratings and 
supervisor-ratings of leadership in these two samples being significantly different. 
The lower correlation between peer-ratings and supervisor-ratings of leadership 
in the Chinese culture is not caused by in-group practices, since the mean of 
peer-ratings was as low as that of supervisor-ratings. It is not caused by the high 
power distance as well, since subordinates agreed with peers and supervisors 
reasonably well. The lower correlation is not caused by the restriction of range 
either, though the standard deviations of peer- and supervisor-ratings were the 
lowest within each perspective. The GDT sample also displayed smaller standard 
deviations than the U.S. sample in both ratings but the correlation was slightly 
higher than that in the U.S. sample. The reason for the lower correlation between 
peer- and supervisor-ratings in the Chinese sample may lie in a lack of team 
practices at the higher level of the organization in China. Chinese supervisors 
may be less likely to act as team leaders. As a result, supervisors and peers may 
observe different behaviors of the same ratee and come up with different ratings.  
With the U.S. participants, peer-rating has established itself as a more 
reliable and valid measure than self-rating and subordinate-rating (Conway & 
Huffcutt, 1997; Harris & Schaubroeck, 1988), and self-peer agreement has a 
stronger relationship with performance than self-subordinate agreement (e.g., 
Atwater et al., 2005; Atwater et al., 1998; Ostroff et al., 2004). However, in the 
Chinese sample, peer-ratings correlated less with supervisor-ratings and the 
relationship between self-peer agreement and performance was less pronounced 
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than that with self-subordinate agreement. Self- and peer-ratings usually account 
for more variance in performance than do self- and subordinate-ratings, 
consistent with the general finding that the correlation between peer-ratings and 
supervisor-ratings is the highest among all correlation coefficients. However, the 
opposite was found in the Chinese sample. The subordinate perspective seems 
to be more important than the peer perspective in the Chinese setting.  
Therefore, the correlations between ratings in the Chinese sample are 
similar to those in the U.S. sample. There are several reasons for not finding the 
expected relationships in the Chinese sample. First, the majority of the Chinese 
participants are from multinational companies and people may have been 
socialized to behave differently under the influence of the well established 
organizational structure and culture. Second, Chinese culture is under change 
and the new generation of mangers in China is becoming more individualist than 
older managers (Ralston et al., 1999). For managers working in multinational 
companies, this trend can be even more prominent. Third, other processes may 
exist and offset the effects expected. For example, collectivists may have fewer 
self-linked memories than individualists and generally know more about others 
than about self (Triandis, 1994). Fourth, from the measurement perspective, 
aggregating ratings may have cancelled out the effects of in-group practices. 
Because self-, subordinate-, and peer-ratings are all related to performance, and 
also because in-group practices and power distance seem to have little impact 
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on ratings, using MSF in the Chinese culture, at least for multinational companies 
operating in China, seems appropriate. 
Although the self-other correlations in the GDT sample appeared 
consistently lower than those in the U.S. sample, the EQS results suggested the 
differences were not significant, leading to the rejection of Hypothesis 5. 
However, the differences between the Chinese and the GDT samples indicated 
that the latter may indeed had lower self-other correlations. A more careful 
selection of participants for the GDT sample may be able to help achieve the 
results expected. The correlations among other-ratings in the GDT sample were 
not different from those in the U.S. sample either, lending support to Hypothesis 
6.  Therefore, raters can reach consensus about a ratee’s performance 
satisfactorily despite cultural, language, and geographical barriers, suggesting 
that using MSF in GDTs is quite plausible. The structured work environment 
characterized by GDTs may have contributed to overcoming the barriers.   
Person perception theories (e.g., Kenny, 1991, 1994) provide some 
important insights how accuracy is possible in such adversarial situations. When 
a rater works with a ratee for some time, he/she will observe a large amount of 
the ratee’s behaviors and give ratings based on the behaviors. Consensus will be 
influenced by the amount of behavior observed, the degree of overlap of 
behavior between raters, behavioral consistency of the ratee, raters’ meaning 
systems, communication between raters, and other unique impressions formed 
through interactions. While consensus may be jeopardized by fewer behaviors 
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being observed, dissimilar meaning systems, and constrained communication, a 
more structured working environment (using conference calls, emails) typical in 
GDTs may help to improve consensus. As shown in assessment centers, the 
more structured the situation, the more accurate the rating. It also suggests that 
observing relevant behaviors may be more important than observing more 
behaviors (Landy & Farr, 1980). 
Demographics Effects    
Among the three demographic variables, age had the most consistent 
effects on self-ratings, with older ratees tending to give themselves higher ratings 
than their younger counterparts. Since other-ratings were generally not affected 
by age, older ratees would be more likely to overestimate themselves. This 
finding is consistent with what has been reported in Ostroff et al. (2004). The 
overestimation effect may reflect that older managers are less receptive to 
feedback in these cultures (Ryan, Brutus, Gregurus, & Hakel, 2000), and that 
they rely more on self-concept for ratings. Interestingly, age was positively 
related to supervisor-ratings of leadership but negatively to supervisor-ratings of 
performance in the GDT sample. It seems that older managers have the same 
level of leadership as their younger counterparts, but their performance is not as 
high as the latter. Older managers may have disadvantages to handle heavy 
workload, time zone differences, and extended travel that are common in GDTs.  
 Strong demographic effects on self-other agreement were present in the 
Chinese sample. Demographic variables accounted for 5.6% of variance in self- 
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ratings, which was disproportionately higher that in other-ratings, suggesting self-
ratings in China are severely confounded with various stereotypes. Demographic 
variables also played an important role in supervisor-ratings, with more than 
2.5% of variance being accounted for. In contrast, subordinate- and peer-ratings 
were less affected. The strong demographic effects present in self- and 
supervisor-ratings suggest that the collective self-concept has been called up in 
the ratings. It has been suggested Chinese pay more attention context than 
content (e.g., Triandis, 2000), so they may rely less on self-concept for ratings 
than their individualist counterparts. This speculation seems to be unfounded. 
Collectivists are equally likely to call up self-concept when ambiguities arise, 
except that they tend to leverage the collective one. 
In the Chinese sample, males gave themselves higher ratings than 
females, while subordinate- and peer-ratings were not related to gender. 
Therefore, males were over-estimators compared with subordinates and peers 
while females were accurate estimators, consistent with Atwater and 
Yammarino’s (1997) and Ostroff et al.’s (2004) propositions. Females have 
accurate self-ratings because they are more responsive to feedback than males, 
who usually are more assertive, confident, and ignorant of feedback (Roberts & 
Nolen-Hoeksema, 1994). However, in the Ostroff et al. study, the overestimation 
effect in males was resulted from lower other-ratings, not from different self-
ratings. It seems that under the same overestimation effect there exist different 
dynamisms. Interestingly, both dynamisms were present when supervisor-ratings 
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were considered in the Chinese sample. While males rated themselves higher 
than females, their supervisor-ratings gave them lower ratings than females. It is 
unclear why supervisors in the Chinese sample gave higher ratings to females 
than males. One possible reason is females have better foreign language skills 
than males, which makes them look more competent when working in 
multinational companies. Future studies should investigate whether the gender 
effects on supervisor-ratings reflect real performance differences between males 
and females or just are artifacts.   
Education level was also related to self-other agreement in the Chinese 
sample. Managers with more education rated themselves higher than those with 
less education. However, their subordinates and peers did not rate them 
differently. Managers with more education were over-estimators compared with 
subordinates and peers. In contrast, supervisor-ratings were positively related to 
education level in the U.S. sample, but self-ratings were not. Managers with less 
education seemed to be over-estimators in the U.S. sample, supporting the 
notion that mangers with more education have better analytical skills and thus 
are able to achieve greater self-other agreement (Fletcher & Baldry, 2000). 
Therefore, different dynamisms may exist in the Chinese and the U.S. samples 
regarding the role of education level in self-other agreement. The tendency to 
assign ratees with more education higher ratings may originate from an 
entrenched and long-lasting belief in education in the Chinese culture.  
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Therefore, demographic effects in the Chinese sample appear more 
salient that those in the U.S. sample, which may indicate that the collective self-
concept dominant in the Chinese culture has a strong influence on ratings, 
especially for self-ratings and supervisor-ratings. According to the framework 
proposed in this study, self-concept will be called up to construe ratings when a 
behavior has been observed repeatedly, when a behavior cannot be recalled 
readily, or when inconsistent behaviors are observed. For Chinese supervisors, 
there are three possible reasons for showing strong demographic effects. First, 
they may observe fewer behaviors of the ratee due to high power distance. 
Second, they are more likely to receive conflicting information about a behavior 
conducted by the ratee from others due to in-group practices. Finally, they 
usually have limited time to fill out the MSF questionnaire, in fear of increasing 
the cost of being indecisive (Fiske, 1993). For Chinese ratees, often times they 
must act differently to meet sometimes incommensurable expectations and thus 
their behaviors become less consistent. As a result, they may experience more 
ambiguities than their U.S. counterparts in the process of rating own behaviors. 
In addition, it has been suggested that collectivists have fewer self-linked 
memories than individualists (Triandis, 1994) and their self-concepts are less 
consistent (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). When ambiguities arise, people from the 
collectivist culture will either base their self-ratings on behaviors or resort to their 
collective self-concepts. Therefore, the salient demographic effects present in the 
Chinese culture may suggest that the collective self-concept has been called up.  
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In contrast, ratings in GDTs seemed to be more objective than those in 
China. Self-ratings were not biased by gender and education, although older 
managers still tended to overestimate themselves. The degree of overestimation 
increased compared with supervisor-ratings, as supervisors gave younger 
managers higher ratings. With this exception, supervisor-ratings demonstrated 
few stereotypical biases. Therefore, it can be argued that ratings in GDTs are 
based more on behaviors observed than the Chinese case, thus supporting the 
proposition that GDTs provide a structured environment that facilitates behavior 
observation. However, some may argue for an alternative explanation. That is, 
demographic effects are less salient in GDTs because people from different 
cultures may have different stereotypes about gender and educational level.  
Overall, demographic variables affect ratings extensively in the Chinese 
sample. High self-ratings are associated with older, more educated, and male 
ratees, and high supervisor-ratings are related to more education and females. In 
contrast, few demographic effects are present in GDTs. Ostroff, et al. (2004) 
found demographic effects were similar across self-subordinate, self-peer, and 
self-supervisor comparisons. However, this study shows the opposite. 
Substantial differences exist across both comparisons and samples. Moreover, 
the same overestimation effect may have different underlying dynamisms in 
different cultures. Therefore, research on demographics and self-other 
agreement will be more valuable when cultural influences are taken into account.       
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Self-Other Agreement and Performance 
Self-other agreement was found to be related to supervisor-ratings of 
performance with all three samples combined. However, the relationships 
between self-other agreement and performance in this study appear weaker than 
those found in the Atwater et al. (2005) study. In this study, self-subordinate 
ratings accounted for about 8% of variance in performance while self-peer ratings 
accounted for about 12% of it. In the Atwater et al. study, the numbers were 23% 
and 32%, respectively. However, the numbers in this study are higher than those 
listed in the Ostroff et al. (2004) study, which are 5% and 11%, respectively. The 
differences may result from the selection of performance criterion. Ostroff et al. 
used the same performance criterion as this study, while Atwater et al. used a 
one-item scale that measured overall competence. As reported by Atwater et al., 
the one-item scale correlated .58 with the five-item scale used in this study. 
These two criteria are different in terms of the construct being measured, with the 
former measuring competency and the latter measuring results. The overall 
competency measure is more proximal to ratings of leadership and narrower than 
the performance measure. Using a broad measure such as overall performance 
may result in underestimation of a relationship due to bandwidth differences 
(Hogan & Roberts, 1996). 
The relationship between self-other agreement suggested by MSF 
researchers (e.g., Atwater & Yammarino, 1997; Yammarino and Atwater, 1993) 
can be illustrated through self-peer agreement in the U.S. sample. Performance 
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decreases as self-peer ratings move from the high end to the low end and 
performance drops at an increasing rate as ratings become lower along the line 
of perfect agreement. Over-estimators receive lower performance ratings than 
under-estimators and performance decreases at an increasing rate as lack of 
agreement increases along the line of complete disagreement. The best 
performers will be accurate estimators with high self-ratings and the worst 
performers will be accurate estimators with low self-ratings. Extreme under-
estimators have lower performance than accurate estimators. However, such an 
ideal pattern of relationship between self-other agreement and performance 
seems to only present in the U.S. sample. 
Self-Agreement and Performance in China 
In comparison to the U.S. and the GDT sample, the response surfaces in 
the Chinese sample were rather flat, which may suggest that Chinese raters are 
less discriminating in rating others (Atwater et al., 2005). Overestimation was 
only weakly related to lower performance ratings. Under-estimators didn’t 
perform worse than accurate estimators and over-estimators. While accurate 
estimators with high self-ratings remained to be the best performers, extreme 
over-estimators who had very high self-ratings but very low other-ratings tended 
to have the poorest performance.   
In the Chinese culture, underestimation can be associated with such 
Confucian virtues as humility and empathy in China. These virtues help to reduce 
interpersonal or inter-clique conflicts and maintain harmony in a group. 
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Maintaining a good interpersonal relationship with others is critical to achieve 
good performance in the Chinese culture. On the contrary, overestimation 
reflects an inflated self-concept, less willingness to accept negative feedback 
(Yammarino & Atwater, 1997), as well as poorer social skills (Colvin, Block & 
Funder, 1995), and could result in worse performance (Kwan et al., 2004). In the 
Chinese setting, having poorer social skills or focusing overly on himself/herself 
may prevent a manger from fulfilling role demands and meeting other’s 
expectations, making it difficult to solicit others’ support. As a result, performance 
may suffer considerably. 
While underestimation corresponds to better performance in China, the 
overestimation effect may take place only in extreme conditions. As shown in 
Figures 4e and 4f, when subordinate- or peer-ratings were at their lower end, the 
relationship between self-ratings and performance became negative, suggesting 
a possible overestimation effect that overrode the self-rating effect. That is, the 
more self-ratings depart subordinate- or peer-ratings, the lower the performance, 
with extreme over-estimators (very high self-ratings but very low subordinate- or 
peer-ratings) having the lowest performance. In this sense, the overestimation 
effect in China is more pronounced than that in the U.S.. However, cautions 
should be taken as the polynomial regression equations are based on only 428 
cases. The conclusion that extreme over-estimators will have the lowest 
performance in China is only tentative.  
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A weak leveling effect at the lower end of the line of perfect agreement 
was found for both self-subordinate and self-peer agreement in the Chinese 
sample. Accurate estimators who rate themselves low do not necessarily have 
low performance, which is quite unusual when compared to other samples in this 
study and the samples from individualist cultures (Atwater et al., 2005). Atwater 
et al. reported a leveling effect at the upper end of the line of perfect agreement 
for countries with low masculinity/individualist cultures such as France and 
Denmark. They speculated that people in the low masculinity culture are inclined 
to avoid competition and thus give high performers less discriminating ratings. 
They also speculated that collectivists will give less discriminating ratings. While 
this study shows that overall other-ratings in China are less discriminating than 
those in the U.S., they may be particularly poorer in differentiating low performers.  
Self-Other Agreement and Performance in GDTs 
In GDTs, self-ratings, the quadratic term of self-ratings, and the product of 
self-ratings and other-ratings were not significant. A weak relationship was found 
between self-ratings and performance in GDTs, which suggests that 
overestimation and underestimation would be less relevant. The weak 
relationship between self-ratings and performance resembles those found in 
European countries (Atwater et al., 2005). A follow-up analysis was conducted by 
breaking GDTs down into different sub-types. When a ratee was in one country 
while his/her subordinates or peers were in other countries, the relationship 
between self-ratings and performance remained significant. However, when a 
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ratee was with part of his/her team in one country and the remaining team in 
other countries, self-ratings were barely related to performance. If the findings 
with the sub-types can be replicated in future studies, a conclusion can be drawn 
that it is not the cultural differences between the rater and the ratee that cause 
inaccurate self-ratings. Instead, it is the existence of multiple meaning systems in 
a team that makes accurate self-ratings difficult to achieve.  
Surrounded by multiple meaning systems, ratees face more challenges to 
collect feedback and make sense how they are performing, while other-raters are 
less affected. For ratees in GDTs, cultural, language and communication barriers 
make accurate feedback collection less convenient. Moreover, ratees in GDTs 
may experience more surprises than those in other settings because their 
behaviors are more likely to receive different reactions from other and result in 
different consequences. They may have more difficulty in interpreting the 
feedback cues and make sense of them. As a result, self-ratings in GDTs 
become less accurate than those in other settings. For other-raters, although 
their ratings are also affected by different meaning systems, the challenges are 
of less significance. Other-raters just need to focus on the ratee’s behavior they 
observe, not necessarily all others’ perceptions. Actually, the more structured 
work environment in GDTs may help to facilitate behavioral observation. 
Therefore, MSF can be applied to GDTs, based on the robust correlations found 
between other-ratings, but self-other agreement will be of less avail, due to its 
low relationship with performance.  
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Generalizability of the Self-Other Agreement Effect 
MSF researchers (e.g., Atwater & Yammrino, 1997; Yammarino & Atwater, 
1993) claim that self-other agreement offers additional value to MSF as accurate 
estimators would have higher performance than over-estimators. This claim has 
been supported by dozens of studies with U.S. samples (e.g., Atwater et al., 
1998; Atwater et al, 2005, Ostroff et al., 2004; Van Velsor, Taylor & Leslie, 1993). 
An interesting area for research is to find out whether the pattern of relationship 
persists in different cultures.  
Based on what have been found in the Atwater et al. (2005) study and this 
study, it seems clear that the results achieved from U.S. samples are the 
exception rather than rule. Self-ratings were not related to performance in the 
European countries (Atwater et al., 2005) and the GDT sample in this study, and 
thus self-other agreement provided little additional value in these settings. Self-
ratings did relate to performance and accurate estimators with high self-ratings 
were found to have high performance in the Chinese sample, but the response 
surfaces displayed a different pattern of relationships. The response surfaces in 
the Chinese culture were rather flat, with a weak leveling effect at the low end of 
the line of perfect agreement. Therefore, the results found with the U.S. samples 
may not be replicable in other cultural settings.  
If such a conclusion holds with more studies, the underlying psychological 
mechanisms that cause self-other agreement effect are more likely to be unique 
in the U.S. culture. Past research has suggested that such psychological 
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constructs as self-awareness, self-monitoring, self-esteem, and self-
enhancement bias may contribute to the self-other agreement effect (e.g., 
Fletcher, 1997; London & Smither, 1995; Wohlers & London, 1989). However, 
these constructs may reflect a unique western view of the individual as an 
independent, self-contained, and autonomous entity (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). 
As a result, they may not be as relevant in other cultures. People from a 
collectivist culture attend to others more than their individualist counterparts 
(Markus & Kitayama, 1991), so self-awareness may play a less significant role in 
such a culture. Individualists practice more self-enhancement than collectivists 
while the latter may instead value self-criticism (Kitayama, Markus, Matsumoto, & 
Norasakkunkit, 1997), so self-enhancement bias may be of less relevance in a 
collectivist culture.      
However, it should be noted that the conclusion regarding the uniqueness 
of self-other agreement in the U.S. culture is still tentative. The non-American 
samples have been either small or heterogeneous and may not be representative. 
In this study, the Chinese sample included only 428 ratees, compared with 3896 
U.S. ratees in the Atwater et al. (2005) study. The quadratic and cross-product 
terms in the polynomial regression usually account for a very small account of 
variance in performance, often times only about 1% (e.g., Atwater et al., 1998). A 
large sample size is needed to make self-other agreement effects more 
observable. Similar to the non-American samples in the Atwater et al. (2005) 
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study, the GDT sample was also heterogeneous as there were multiple sub-
types. 
A Revisit of the Framework  
The framework proposed in the present study tries to integrate two 
perception-based models: Hanges et al.’s (2002) connectionist model of 
leadership perception and Kenny’s (1991) weighted-average model of person 
perception. The former model places emphasis on self-concept, with an attempt 
to understand how people perceive the same leadership behavior differently. The 
latter model stresses behavior, being more interest in how people perceive a 
personality trait with consensus. These two models, when put together, offer 
exceptional value to understand the rating process of MSF.   
Particularly, the integrated framework proposes that consensus between 
raters and self-other agreement share the same process. Raters or ratees 
observe/recall behaviors, process them through self-concepts, and form 
perceptions. Agreement between any two individuals will be determined by 
factors that affect behavior and self-concept. Culture is such a factor that can 
exert its influence through self-concept and collective behavioral patterns.  
While some cultural effects were identified in this study, they didn’t apply 
to consensus between raters and self-other agreement in the same way. 
Consensus between raters was stable across different cultural settings while self-
other agreement was culturally sensitive. In addition, demographic effects were 
consistently observed in self-ratings, and the effects were different across 
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cultures, indicating that self-ratings were heavily sourced from self-concepts. 
Self-concept seems to play a larger role in self-other agreement than in 
consensus between raters. In other words, consensus between raters is based 
more on behavior than on self-concept, with an assumption that behavior will be 
less influenced by culture.  
The assumption that culture has few effects on behavior is not consistent 
with what has been proposed in the framework. However, this assumption makes 
sense if we consider the fact that participants in the Chinese and the GDT 
samples are mostly from multinational companies. These companies usually are 
the most developed in terms of organizational structure and organizational 
culture. Behavior will be constrained by these higher-level factors and becomes 
more consistent. As such, the speculation that culture has less impact on 
behavior is warranted, at least in such settings as multinational companies.  
Therefore, it seems reasonable to conclude that consensus between 
other-ratings will be stable across different cultural settings because raters tend 
to base their ratings on behaviors, while these job-related behaviors are not 
culturally bound. On the contrary, self-other agreement will vary in different 
cultural settings because self-ratings are heavily sourced from self-concept in the 
condition of ambiguity, while self-concept is culturally saturated. This conclusion 
doesn’t necessarily mean that other-ratings are effective in any settings. Other 
contextual factors, such as organizational structure and organizational culture, 
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may play a role here, and thus the effectiveness of other-ratings may vary in 
different organizations.  
Limitations 
There are several limitations in this study that researchers should be 
aware of in future research. First, the archival data set used in this study does 
not have individual ratings. Therefore, all analyses of this study are based on 
aggregated scores. Using aggregated scores is only an indirect way to 
investigate culture’s effects on self-other agreement and performance. Cultural 
effects (e.g., the effects of in-group practices) can be either confounded with 
source effects or canceled out with each other as the result of aggregation. In 
addition, aggregation may help to improve the reliabilities of subordinate- and 
peer-ratings. Consequently, correlations between other-ratings will appear more 
stable in different settings than self-other correlations. Research based on 
individual scores (e.g., Mount et al., 1998; Scullen, Mount, & Goff, 2000) should 
help us to better understand cultural effects and is able to provide direct 
validation to the framework proposed in this study.  
Second, the samples used in this study are not totally random, especially 
for the Chinese and the GDT samples. The participants are managers and 
executives who have participated in leadership development programs offered by 
a management consulting firm. Most of them are from big companies and 
multinational companies, primary users of MSF. Nevertheless, these companies 
cover a wide array of industries and the participants represent very diverse 
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functions. The U.S. sample was randomly selected from more than 20,000 
managers and executives who worked in the U.S. as non-expatriates. Therefore, 
the sample should be able to represent the population adequately. Constrained 
by sample size, convenience sampling was used for the other two samples. 
Similar to the U.S. sample, these two samples also cover a wide array of 
functions and industries. In addition, the number of participants from each 
company was limited to less than 10% of the total participants in a sample, in 
order to ensure unbiased representativeness. Therefore, the Chinese and the 
GDT samples are free from dominant influences of a company, a function, or an 
industry.  
Third, GDT is not clearly defined and its sub-types are not specified. This 
study loosely defined GDT as a unit with members working in different countries, 
instead of an interdependent work group comprising of culturally diverse 
members based in two or more nations who share a collective responsibility for 
making or implementing decisions related to a firm's global strategy (Cohen & 
Mankin, 1999). As hindsight, this study identified four sub-types of GDT and 
found the relationship between self-other agreement and performance was 
different in these sub-types. Future studies should clearly define which sub-type 
of GDT to examine and collect a large sample accordingly.  
Fourth, as this was an exploratory study, moderators were not included. 
Some influential moderators could include cultural distance (Church, 1982) and 
management level. Cultural distance may be important in GDTs. For an 
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American manager, working with a British subordinate is a different assessment 
context from working with a Japanese subordinate. The relationship of self-other 
agreement and performance can be different in these two situations too. The 
moderating effects of job type have been well documented (e.g., Conway & 
Huffcut, 1997). Correlations between sources are generally lower for managerial 
jobs than nonmanagerial jobs, due to higher complexity and invisibility in 
managerial jobs. In GDTs, it is possible that such moderating effects become 
more prominent due to increasing ambiguities in their work environment. The 
effects become even more prominent for middle managers and executives as 
they constantly work across multiple cultural boundaries. Management level may 
thus become an important moderator.    
Fifth, this study used supervisor-ratings of performance, which were 
collected along with the MSF questionnaire, as the performance index. This may 
raise some concern for common method errors. While the concern is warranted,  
the correlation between performance and supervisor-ratings of leadership is at 
around .75, not an exceptionally high correlation if considering the high 
reliabilities of these two measures (around .90). Some disparate relationships are 
also observed with these two measures. For example, the correlations between 
supervisor-ratings of leadership and other ratings are higher than those between 
performance and other ratings. Age was not related to supervisor-ratings of 
leadership but was related to performance. Therefore, the concern for common 
method errors can be eased.          
 
                                                                                                  
 148 
 Finally, related to the sampling issue, more local companies need to be 
included in future studies. Including the majority of participants from multinational 
companies may be responsible for weak cultural effects between the U.S. and 
the Chinese samples. However, it should be noted that more time must pass 
before Chinese local companies can adopt MSF practices. In addition, language 
and measurement equivalence issues may become prominent when MSF is 
used in local companies. From the business perspective, research using 
participants from multinational companies is still the most valuable.  
Future Research and Implications 
This study proposes a new framework of self-other agreement that have a 
great promise to study contextual influences. However, an empirical study based 
on the U.S., the Chinese, and the GDT samples lends only partial support to the 
framework. Limitations of the empirical study have been posed and remedies can 
follow. To isolate cultural effects from other effects, individual scores should be 
adopted in future studies. In addition, participants from local Chinese companies 
should be sampled in order to make comparisons between cultures. Furthermore, 
the moderating effects of cultural distance and management level should be 
taken into consideration. Finally, more samples from high collectivist cultures, 
such as Korea and Japan, can be adopted to replicate this study.  
This research could be the first attempt to investigate MSF’s application in 
GDTs. Much work has been done to investigate the performance and process of 
distributed teams (e.g., Cramton, 2001; Hinds & Bailey, 2003; McDonough, 
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Kahnb, & Barczaka, 2001), but little pays attention to leadership perception in 
these settings. Although there is limited support for hypotheses concerning GDTs 
in this study, this line of research should be continued as it might provide critical 
insights into the MSF process in settings with heterogeneous cultures. Similar 
suggestions have been proposed to explore feedback-seeking dynamics in 
multinational companies (Ashford, Blatt, & VandeWalle, 2003). In future studies, 
sub-types of GDT should be identified. Unique cultural and organizational 
challenges may exist in different sub-types. When a manager works with his/her 
subordinates in one nation and his/her peers work in a separate nation, the GDT 
could be embedded in a hierarchical structure. Consensus between other-ratings 
will be lower as interaction is usually constrained under such a structure. In 
contrast, when a manager works with part of his/her subordinates and peers in 
the same nation, the GDT could be embedded in a team-based structure. Intense 
interactions among team members may increase consensus between them. Self-
other agreement as well as the relationship between self-other agreement and 
performance can be substantially different in these two situations. 
Studies using expatriates as participants could be another promising way 
to investigate how culture affects the relationship between self-other agreement 
and performance. Adjustment and performance of expatriates have received a lot 
of attention from researchers (Black et al., 1991) but little research exists 
regarding how MSF works for expatriates. Expatriates usually share a different 
meaning system with his/her subordinates, peers and supervisors, which may 
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affect self-other agreement. Moreover, expatriates working in the U.S. may have 
different experience with those working in China, and MSF may work differently 
too. The framework proposed in this study can help to develop hypotheses for 
different expatriate samples. Results from these samples will further our 
understanding of culture’s impact on self-other agreement.   
A comparison between MSF and assessment centers conducted by this 
study suggests that the more structured the process the more accurate the rating. 
This notion receives some support from the GDT sample, where consensus 
between other-ratings remained high despite cultural, language, and 
geographical barriers. The structured environment of GDT may help to improve 
the degree of overlap and reduce unique impressions, which then compensate 
the unfavorable effects of dissimilar meaning systems and constrained 
communication. Future studies could include structuredness of the work 
environment as a moderator.    
The results of this study also echo the question raised by Atkins and 
Wood (2002) regarding what criterion should be chosen for self-other agreement 
study. Atkins and Wood found self-ratings were negatively related to assessment 
center results and thus self-other agreement effects were not present with 
objectively measured criterion. However, their study was based on only 63 
participants, making the finding less reliable. Moreover, Ostroff et al. (2004) 
observed some pronounced self-other agreement effects with compensation as 
criterion. Therefore, both subjective and objective criteria are appropriate for self-
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other agreement studies. Atwater et al. (2005) used one-item competency 
measure as criterion in their study, which may contribute to some differences 
found between this study and theirs. It seems that self-other agreement effects 
are more pronounced with a proximal criterion and become less prominent with a 
distal criterion. Compensation is a proximate criterion because supervisor-ratings 
of performance are often used to determine compensation level. Future studies 
should play close attention to which criterion to use and clearly state the 
construct linkages between predictor and criterion. More research using different 
criteria will be welcome.  
Another interesting research question is whether consensus between 
other-ratings and self-other agreement share the same process. Many studies 
(e.g., Atwater & Yammarino, 1997; Ostroff et al., 2004) have tried to explore how 
self- and other-ratings are affected by different factors, but little work has been 
done to clarify the processes. This study attempts to integrate the processes of 
consensus between other-ratings and self-other agreement into one shared 
process. However, the results in this study indicate consensus between other-
ratings is stable across different settings while self-other agreement is not, 
suggesting that they may belong to separate processes. Nevertheless, the 
proposition for one shared process has not been ruled out, since it is possible 
that self-concept has disparate effects on self- and other-ratings in the same 
process. Future research should be conducted to answer this question.  
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Implications for Practice 
From the practical standpoint, this study offers some useful guidelines to 
the feedback section of MSF. A feedback section is an occasion where a coach 
(a HR personnel or a consultant) goes through the feedback report, which has 
integrated ratings from different perspectives, and tries to make sense of the 
information on the report, with the ratee. A feedback section is more a dialog 
between a coach and a ratee than a mere information exchange process. Under 
the assistance of the coach, the ratee will gain insights about himself/herself and 
become motivated to make changes. One key factor of success in this process is 
to understand self-ratings and their relationship to other-ratings. In the U.S, when 
both self-ratings and other-ratings are related to performance, self-other 
agreement provides additional insights. For the European countries, self-ratings 
may be less relevant and self-other agreement provides little additional 
information, so emphasis of the feedback section should be placed upon other-
ratings. In China, although both self- and other-ratings are related to performance, 
the relationship is generally additive, which means self-other agreement also 
adds little value to the feedback section. In GDTs, self-ratings seem to be 
unrelated to performance but it may result from conflicting meaning systems. 
Self-ratings should not be treated as errors. Instead, a different epistemological 
approach can be adopted. Ashford et al. (2003) noted that intercultural 
communication differences may increase the effort costs of feedback seeking 
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and cause self-other discrepancies. The feedback section can be seen as an 
opportunity to facilitate such intercultural communication.  
This study has important implications for MSF practice in multinational 
companies. First, this study indicates that culture has little impact on other-
ratings, so multinational companies can readily use MSF for leadership 
development and other purposes. Subordinates, peers, and supervisors provide 
some unique perspectives about the ratees, while their ratings are all inter-
correlated. This message is especially important to GDTs, where team members 
are located in different nations. Ratings from people who work distantly are 
equally informative. Second, this study offers some tips that can be used in MSF 
data interpretation. For example, subordinate-ratings tend to provide more 
information related to performance than peer-ratings in China, so peer-ratings 
should not be over-emphasized. In GDTs, peer-ratings, stead of subordinate-
ratings, provide more performance-related information, and thus should be 
stressed. These tips may help to facilitate a dialog between a coach and a ratee, 
but should not be overstated.  
Continuous improvement on MSF process is also expected in practice. 
Improvements can include better rating format, more effective rater training, and 
even different ways to conduct MSF. As an example, the ratee can be asked to 
come up with a list of critical incidents that both he/she and raters have been 
involved in. These critical incidents can be seen as work samples or simulations 
in assessment centers. Raters can then recall the ratee’s behaviors in these 
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incidents and discuss their effectiveness. By imposing more structure, self-other 
agreement and consensus between other-ratings can be greatly improved.    
 




This study intends to follow up a previous study conducted by Atwater et 
al. (2005), which compared the relationship between self-other agreement and 
performance across several countries, including the U.S. and five other 
European countries, with three different samples. In addition to a Chinese 
sample, which has been expected by Ostroff et al, this study also includes a 
sample composed of globally dispersed teams (GDTs). Results from these 
additional samples are valuable for fully understanding the relationship between 
self-other agreement and performance as well as culture’s role in the relationship.  
A thorough review of the history and current states of MSF and self-other 
agreement studies indicates a need to go beyond the narrow psychometric 
perspective and reach out to other research fields. A comprehensive comparison 
between MSF and assessment centers suggests MSF should take contextual 
factors into consideration and structure the process as much as possible. 
Leadership perception theories (e.g., Hanges et al, 2000) and person perception 
theories (e.g., Kenny, 1991) provide additional insights into the rating process of 
MSF, with the former emphasizing self-concept and the latter focusing on 
behavior and consensus. Two current models of self-other agreement (Campbell, 
1985, Yammarino & Atwater, 1993) were then introduced, with their strengths 
and weaknesses highlighted. A new framework was proposed based on these 
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pre-existing models and related theories from leadership and person perception 
fields.  
The new framework delineates how two raters observe one’s behaviors, 
process them through self-concepts, and reach ratings under the influence of a 
wide array of contextual factors. It provides a dynamic and multi-level account of 
the consensus/self-other agreement process. In this framework, six factors 
proposed by Kenny (1991): acquaintance, overlap, behavioral consistency, 
similar meaning systems, communication and unique impression, play an 
important role in consensus making and self-other agreement. The first three 
factors are specifically related to behaviors, but this framework doesn’t demand 
all ratings should be based on behavior. Self-concept will be the main source of 
self-ratings when a behavior has been repeated or observed numerous times, 
inconsistent behaviors are present, or no behavior can be readily recalled. While 
the alternative approach is efficient, it also results in underestimation or 
overestimation. Under this framework, culture plays its role in two different ways. 
First, it affects the self-concept or the meaning system. Second, it affects 
collective behavior patterns people interact, such as how to display behaviors in 
different situations and how to communicate with each other.   
The Chinese culture was depicted as a culture characterized with high 
collectivism/high power distance, which is the opposite of the U.S. culture. Being 
in a high collectivist/high power distance culture, Chinese are concerned about 
other’s perceptions than Americans. In addition, Chinese pay more attention to 
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context and are inclined to interpret behavior in the context, and thus rely less on 
self-concept to derive ratings. Accordingly, it was hypothesized that self-other 
correlations in the Chinese culture would be higher than that in the U.S. culture. 
The hypothesis is not supported. While Chinese may attend to other’s 
expectations more, they have the same tendency to base their ratings on self-
concept when ambiguities arise. Nevertheless, they may call up the collective 
self-concept, as evidenced with strong demographic effects found in Chinese 
ratees and their supervisors. Chinese workplace is believed to be more 
fragmented than that in the U.S., due to in-group practices and status differences. 
However, the notion that in-group practices and status differences will result in 
lower correlations between other-ratings is not supported. Although the 
correlation between peer- and supervisor-ratings in the Chinese culture is lower 
than that in the U.S. culture, in-group practices and status differences seem to 
play limited part in it. It was hypothesized that overestimation would be 
particularly problematic in China as failing to understand other’s expectations 
would be especially detrimental. However, the overestimation effect was 
observed only in some extreme conditions where self-ratings were very high and 
other-ratings were very low. Underestimation may reflect such Confucian virtues 
as humility and empathy, which can help a ratee effectively respond to other’s 
expectations and gain others’ support, and thus achieve acceptable results. The 
results in this study lend general support to this notion. Consistent with the 
results in the U.S. sample, accurate estimators with high self- and other-ratings 
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tended to have high performance in the Chinese sample. However, an 
unexpected leveling effect was present at the lower end of the line of perfect 
agreement in the Chinese sample, which may suggest that Chinese raters are 
less capable of differentiating low performers.  
This study also investigated the relationship between self-other agreement 
and performance in GDTs. According to the framework proposed in this study, 
the existence of multiple different meaning systems makes meeting other’s 
expectations particularly difficult. Failing to meet other’s expectations could result 
in serious performance issues. In face of more ambiguities, people may also rely 
more on self-concept to derive ratings. Therefore, it was hypothesized that self-
other correlations would be lower in the GDT sample than the U.S. sample. While 
noticeable differences were observed, they failed to reach the significance level. 
The existence of multiple different meaning systems may also impede raters to 
reach consensus, but the use of communication technologies may actually make 
the situation more structured, and thus help to improve consensus between 
ratings. Results from this study lend some support to this latter notion. In GDTs, 
overestimation may reflect a ratee’s tendency to be insensitive to cultural 
differences or overly judgmental, which may result in poor performance. 
Underestimation may indicate lack of self-confidence in multi-cultural settings as 
well as poor adjustment to different cultures, and thus will also cause poor 
performance. However, it was found that self-ratings were not particularly 
relevant to performance in GDTs, due to weak effects of self-ratings on 
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performance. Therefore, the proposition that both overestimation and 
underestimation will cause poor performance is not supported. However, a 
follow-up analysis suggests that weak effects of self-ratings on performance may 
only show up in situations where there are more than two different meaning 
systems in the team.  
Several limitations of this study were proposed. First, only aggregated 
scores were used and cultural effects might have be cancelled out or confounded 
with other effects. Second, this study was based on archival data. Although 
efforts were taken to minimize sampling errors, the samples might not be well 
representative. Third, GDT should be clearly defined and sub-types of GDT 
should be specified. Fourth, moderators, such as management level and cultural 
distance were not included in the study. Finally, participants in the Chinese 
sample were mainly from multinational companies and they might not be the best 
representatives of Chinese culture.  
Future studies should use individual scores, more targeted samples, and 
carefully selected criteria to validate the framework. Studies with other cultures, 
GDTs and expatriates will also be beneficial. More research on consensus or 
self-agreement process is highly expected.  From the practical perspective, this 
study indicates that MSF can be applied to multinational companies in different 
settings. Self-ratings in GDTs may not provide information as valuable as in the 
U.S., but they can be used to initiate a useful dialog with a ratee and help to 
understand how the ratee responds to different cultures. In the feedback section, 
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peer-ratings should be stressed in GDTs but in China subordinate-ratings should 
be emphasized. The process of MSF can also be improved by asking the ratee to 
provide a list of critical incidents, based on which raters could achieve higher 
consensus and more accurate ratings than the traditional MSF.  
Overall, this study contributes to the literature in multiple ways. First, a 
new framework of self-other agreement was proposed by integrating research 
from multiple fields. This framework can be used to guide future self-other 
agreement studies across a wide array of settings. Second, an empirical study 
was conducted which provided some initial validation to the framework. Some 
evidence of support has been found, but more future research can be conducted. 
Third, some important insights have been gained. Specifically, this study 
indicated that: 1) consensus between raters is stable across culture as other-
ratings are based on behavior, which are less influenced by culture; 2) self-other 
agreement varies in different cultures as self-ratings are strongly influenced by 
self-concept, and thus are culturally biased; 3) the relationship between self-other 
agreement and performance typically found in the U.S. could be the exception 
rather than rule. Finally, implications for practice have been suggested. 
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